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Dynamic Spectrum Access (DSA) networks can achieve higher 
spectrum efficiency by exploring the unused spectrum in licensed 
band. Most of the existing work focuses on maximizing the spec-
trum utilization while ignoring the immediate influence from 
the primary (licensed) users to the DSA traffic flows generated 
by secondary (often unlicensed) users. In a DSA network, a 
secondary user of a channel needs to switch to a different fre-
quency band when the primary user of the channel becomes 
active. Since there is no guarantee of sufficient capacity being 
available from an alternative channel for the affected DSA traf-
fic, the scrvicc of the secondary users can be interrupted. Such 
interruption will be particularly damaging for real time DSA 
applications such as VoIP or video conferencing. 
In this thesis, we focus on providing reliability (in terms of a 
probabilistic life-time guarantee) to the DSA flows. W e first pro-
pose 3 protection schemes, namely, the "No Backup"，"Shared 
Backup" and "Non-Shared Backup" schemes, each providing a 
different level of reliability to an end-to-end DSA flow. W e will 
quantify the lifetime distributions of an end-to-end path in a 
DSA network under the aforementioned protection schemes. 
Based on our analysis of the end-to-end path lifetime dis-
i 
tributiori, various route selection algorithms are proposed to 
find paths with long lifetime under the corresponding protec-
tion scheme. The upper bound for the failure probability of a 
path is derived. Such performance bound then serves as an ef-
ficient tool for checking whether a selected path can satisfy the 
reliability requirement of a given DSA flow. 
While each protection scheme can provide a different level of 
lifetime guarantee for a DSA flow, it would consume different 
amount of network capacity. As a third contribution, we study 
the tradeoffs between the network capacity consumption and 
lifetime guarantee provided by different protection schemes. W e 
then design the Adaptive Protection scheme which can minimize 
the capacity consumption while providing the required lifetime 
guarantee for a DSA flow. 
From a network planning perspective, we can further optimize 
the capacity of a DSA network via judicious frequency assign-
ment for the active and backup channels on each DSA link. As 
another contribution of this thesis, we formulate this channel as-
signment problem in DSA networks as an integer programming 
problem to support capacity-efficient link restorations in such 
networks. 
In summary, our work provides both theoretical analyses and 
practical solutions for DSA networks to achieve the required 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction / Motivation 
Dynamic Spectrum Access (DSA) technology enables unlicensed 
devices to use the licensed spectrum efficiently. Spectrum effi-
ciency can be increased if licensed spectrum can be used by un-
licensed devices when unlicensed devices do not cause harmful 
interference to licensed users. Licensed users are often referred 
to as primary users. 
The limitation of DSA networks is that, if an unlicensed de-
vice detects it can cause harmful interference to primary user(s), 
it needs to stop using that licensed spectrum and switch to an-
other unoccupied spectrum. The new spectrum band may not 
have enough capacity to accommodate the increased traffic, es-
pecially in heavily loaded networks. As a result, link capac-
ity can fluctuate significantly, and thus the wireless services of 
the secondary users can be interrupted. The dynamics of the 
presence of primary users can degrade the performance of wire-
less applications, especially those real-time applications such as 
VoIP and video conferencing. 
Reliability has been studied extensively in Mobile Ad-hoc 
Networks (MANET) and wireline networks. When a physical 
link or a wireless link fails, traffic flow can be restored quickly 
to meet the call reliability requirement. However, there are 
two fundamental differences when DSA networks are consid-
ered. First, previous network reliability studies usually assume 
1 
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the failures occur independently. However, in DSA networks, 
when a primary user appears, multiple DSA links can fail simul-
taneously if they can cause harmful interference to that primary 
user. Second, the link failure in M A N E T s or wireline networks 
is caused by an unrecoverable event. In MANETs，link failures 
are often caused by node mobility, while link failures in wireline 
networks are usually due to physical failures such as fiber cuts. 
Therefore, a physically disjoint backup path is often needed to 
restore the failed link or to replace the primary end-to-end path. 
In DSA networks, the link failure is caused by the presence of 
primary user(s). The DSA link can be restored by switching to 
another unoccupied channel. Therefore, no physically diverse 
path is needed as long as an alternative frequency channel is 
available for the ongoing traffic. 
In this thesis, we focus on providing reliability for DSA net-
works. The "lifetime" of a DSA path is defined as the length 
of time before a DSA flow, which has flow demand /, is inter-
rupted. Our objective is to guarantee that with a high probabil-
ity, the lifetime of a DSA path is longer than the call duration. 
W e propose three protection schemes to provide different levels 
of protection, namely, the "No Backup”，"Shared Backup" and 
"Non-Shared Backup" schemes. For the "No Backup" scheme, 
a DSA flow will be interrupted if any one of the links of the path 
is interrupted by a primary user. For the "Non-Shared Backup" 
scheme, each link has an active channel and also a pre-assigned 
backup channel. The link switches to its backup channel once its 
active channel is occupied by a primary user. Backup capacity is 
reserved in the backup channel so that the link still has enough 
capacity to carry the traffic after switching to the backup chan-
nel. The path is interrupted if there exists one link on the path 
such that both active and backup channels are occupied by their 
corresponding primary users. For the "Shared Backup" scheme, 
each DSA link also has active and backup channels. However, 
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the backup capacity can be shared with the neighboring links. 
Therefore, the backup capacity can be taken away by the pri-
mary users or the neighboring links. A path is interrupted if 
there exists one link on the path such that the active channel 
is occupied by a primary user and the backup capacity is taken 
away. 
The lifetime distribution of an end-to-end path under each 
protection scheme is investigated. Also, we derive the upper 
bound for the failure probability of a path. Finding the lifetime 
distributions and the upper bounds are useful in two ways. First, 
it gives an insight for route selection. Second, it provides an 
efficient way for checking whether the selected path satisfies the 
lifetime requirement. 
In Chapter 3，we investigate the lifetime distribution of a 
path without backup protection (No Backup). Computing the 
exact lifetime distribution requires long computation time and 
the node location information. Therefore, we derive an upper 
bound for the failure probability of a path by using the so-called 
"Chain Approximation". The simulation results show that the 
Chain Approximation provides a tight bound under typical net-
work configurations. 
W e then investigate the problem for finding the maximum 
lifetime path without backup protection. Unfortunately, the 
problem is proven to be NP-hard. W e therefore design three 
heuristics to find a long lifetime path (“Minimum Weight", "Greedy" 
and "GACA"). "Greedy" and "GACA" consider the "overlap-
ping area" effect to yield a longer lifetime path compared with 
the "Minimum Weight" heuristic. We also investigate under 
what conditions "GACA" can give significant increase of life-
time compared with the "Minimum Weight" approach. 
In Chapter 4, we prolong the path lifetime by providing 
backup protection using the "Shared Backup" and "Non-Shared 
Backup" schemes. We study the lifetime distribution of a path 
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with backup protection. We also derive the upper bounds for the 
failure probability and design two heuristics for route selection 
for the Shared Backup and Non-Shared Backup schemes. 
We consider the capacity reservation in Chapter 5. For backup 
protection, we need to ensure that the link has enough capacity 
when it switches to its backup channel. Therefore, a link using 
channel c needs to reserve a part of channel capacity to ac-
commodate the increased interference when its interfering links 
switch to channel c as backup channel. We define the capacity 
feasibility constraints for each protection scheme. By extending 
the work in [1] to handle (a) different protection schemes and 
(b) multiple available channels per link, we can find a capacity-
feasible path for a given DSA flow. 
Different protection schemes can provide different levels of 
protection to the DSA flows. However, they also consume differ-
ent amounts of network capacity. The Minimum Weight heuris-
tic consumes the least capacity but provides the shortest lifetime 
guarantee, while the Non-Shared Backup scheme consumes the 
largest amount of capacity to support the longest lifetime guar-
antee. This observation motivates us to design the Adaptive 
Protection scheme to balance the capacity usage and call dura-
tion guarantee, which is the subject of Chapter 6. Based on the 
lifetime guarantee required by a DSA flow, our Adaptive Protec-
tion scheme selects the best protection scheme. It provides the 
needed protection to the DSA flow, while minimizing network 
capacity consumption. 
Prom a network planning perspective, it is possible to further 
optimize the capacity of the DSA networks via judicious chan-
nel assignments for the active and backup channels of each DSA 
link. In Chapter 7, we consider the link demand is a given sys-
tem parameter. Our objective is to maximize the link through-
put with protection consideration. The maximum allowable net-
work load is computed to guarantee that the link throughput for 
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every link using backup channel can be greater than a predefined 
value, e.g. a given fraction of link demand. By considering the 
interference between links, an integer linear programming for-
mulation is developed which gives the optimal assignment and 
sharing of active/backup channels to support link restorations. 
It provides the needed protection for each DSA link, and at the 
same time, maximizes the network throughput. 
In summary, the major contributions of this thesis include: 
1. We propose 3 protection schemes ("No Backup", "Shared 
Backup" and "Non-Shared Backup") to provide different 
levels of protection to the DSA flows. W e investigate 
the lifetime distributions of a path under these protection 
schemes. 
2. We design different route selection algorithms to find a 
long lifetime path under each of the protection scheme. 
We also derive the upper bound for the failure probability 
of a path to facilitate the checking of whether the selected 
path satisfies a given lifetime guarantee requirement. 
3. We study the capacity feasibility constraints for the DSA 
flows. By extending the work in [1] to handle different 
protection schemes and multiple frequency channels per 
link, we can find a capacity-feasible path which provides 
the needed capacity for a DSA flow. 
4. We study the tradeoffs between the capacity consump-
tion and call duration guarantee among different protec-
tion schemes. This motivates us to design an adaptive 
protection scheme to balance the capacity usage and call 
duration guarantee. 
5. We develop an integer linear programming formulation 
which gives the optimal channel assignment to support 
restorations in DSA networks. By considering the ac-
tive/backup channel assignment, backup sharing and in-
terference between links, we can maximize the link through-
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put, and provide a pre-defined level of throughput guar-
antee upon the presence of primary users. 




Fixed spectrum assignment policy restricts the spectrum to be 
used efficiently. Dynamic Spectrum Access enables unlicensed 
users to use the licensed band as long as they do not affect the 
licensed users. Several approaches are proposed to determine 
under what conditions a licensed band can be used by unlicensed 
users. 
An unlicensed user needs to stop using a licensed band if it 
detects it may cause harmful interference to a newly appeared 
licensed user in the band. This causes the unreliability of the 
wireless applications for unlicensed users. Therefore, we study 
how to provide reliability to unlicensed users. Much research has 
studied the reliability issue for wireline and wireless networks. 
W e review the common approaches to protect the networks from 
failures. W e will also point out the fundamental differences when 
compared to the case of supporting DSA flow reliability. 
The capacity should be planned such that it can provide the 
needed capacity to the DSA links when a primary user appears. 
In Section 2.4, we review the existing work for capacity planning 
for multi-hop wireless networks . 
7 
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2.2 Dynamic Spectrum Access Networks 
Many wireless frequency spectrum bands are allocated for spe-
cific uses, e.g. for cellular and T V broadcast services. In order to 
use these spectrum bands, the users should acquire licenses from 
the government authorities. On the other hand, some bands in 
the RF spectrum are available for unlicensed users, using ser-
vices such as WiFi and Bluetooth communications. Anyone can 
use the unlicensed bands if the wireless devices follow the regu-
lations to transmit data. 
Due to the rapid growth of wireless usage, some unlicensed 
bands are over-crowded. Because of the interference between the 
wireless devices, the performance of the wireless applications de-
grades when using these crowded unlicensed bands. However, 
some studies show that many licensed spectrum bands are not 
utilized. For example, [2] shows the measurement of occupancy 
of spectrum band (30MHz to 3000 MHz) in six locations in US. 
The average occupancy of all six locations is 5.2% and the max-
imum occupancy of all locations is 13.1% (New York). These 
results show that the fixed licensed spectrum assignment causes 
inefficient wireless spectrum utilization. 
Dynamic Spectrum Access (DSA) enables unlicensed devices 
to use the licensed spectrum efficiently. The unused licensed 
spectrum is usually referred to as "white space". Spectrum ef-
ficiency can be increased if the white space can be used by un-
licensed devices when no licensed user is using the spectrum. 
This kind of networks is referred to as DSA networks. Licensed 
users are often referred to as "primary users" and the unlicensed 
users are referred to as "secondary users". The secondary users 
should guarantee that they do not cause harmful interference to 
primary users when the latter is presented in the neighborhood. 
Cognitive radio is a key technology that enables secondary 
users to use the licensed spectrum efficiently. Secondary users 
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need to detect white space and switch to it. Also, they need to 
detect the subsequent presence of primary users and ensure no 
harmful interference is created to them. Cognitive radio tech-
nology allows the DSA devices to reconfigure the transmitter 
and receiver parameters based on the sensed RF environment. 
Several approaches have been proposed to define under what 
conditions a licensed band can be used by the secondary users. 
One approach is the interference temperature [3]. Interference 
temperature is defined as: 
= (2.1) 
where Pi(fc, B) is the average interference power centered at 
fc covering bandwidth B. /c is a constant which is equal to 
1.38 X 1023. The secondary users should guarantee that the in-
terference temperature at the primary receiver is less than a 
threshold "interference temperature limit". However, [4] states 
that “interference temperature approach is not a workable con-
cept and would result in increased interference in the frequency 
bands where it would be used,，. This is because it is difficult to 
detect a primary receiver and measure the interference temper-
ature at the receiver. 
5] takes a geographic approach to define the white space. 
For each primary transmitter, it defines a circle as a "primary 
decodability region", in which the primary receiver can decode 
the signal from the primary transmitter within this region. It 
also defines a "no-talk zone" for each primary receiver, which 
refers to the region that the secondary user cannot transmit 
signal so that the primary receiver can decode the signal. The 
size of the no-talk zone depends on the transmission power of the 
secondary user. The higher the transmission power, the larger 
the no-talk zone. If the primary receivers' locations are not 
known by the secondary users, the secondary users can only use 
the licensed bands when it is outside the primary decodability 
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region and the union of all possible no-talk zones. 
Although standard approach has not been confirmed yet to 
decide whether a licensed band can be accessed by the secondary 
users, some existing works use different approaches to model 
the spectrum availability. For example, [6] uses "footprint" to 
abstract the spectrum availability. A footprint of a primary user 
is a circle centered at the primary user. It assumes the primary 
user information is perfectly available at the secondary users. 
A secondary user can use a licensed band if it is outside the 
footprints of primary users which use that licensed band. 
2.3 Reliability 
Reliability has been studied in both wireline and wireless net-
works. In this part, we study the recent work of reliability in 
wireless networks and wireline networks. We will also point out 
the fundamental differences of providing reliability in these net-
works when compared to the case of DSA networks. 
2.3.1 Reliability in Wireless Networks 
Very few existing work considers the reliability issue in DSA 
networks. One of the exceptions is [7] which considers the re-
liable routing in DSA networks. It assumes that for each link, 
the arrival of unused channels follows the Poisson process, and 
the usable duration of a channel is exponentially distributed. 
Also, it assumes that the arrivals of unused channels of different 
links are independent. Each link will have one active channel 
and a limited number of backup channels. If the active channel 
expires, the link will switch to a pre-selected backup channel. 
Based on these assumptions, one can find out the probability 
that a link is connected via continuous time Markov chain anal-
ysis. Furthermore, if the links along a path fail independently, 
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the probability that a path is connected is the probability that 
all links are connected, which is the product of "connected prob-
ability" of all links. However, this paper does not consider the 
capacity feasibility of the spectrum band. 
8] proposes a link maintenance protocol to maintain a reli-
able communication between the secondary users. It defines the 
protocol to exchange the channel status information and select 
the backup channel between the secondary users. 
9-12] investigate the reliability in Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks 
(MANET). The wireless nodes are mobile so that the network 
topology changes frequently. When a node moves out of the 
transmission range of another node, the wireless link between 
them will break. Thus, the link failure is caused by node mobil-
ity. Multi-path routing can be used to provide reliable end-to-
end transmission. When the primary path fails, the traffic can 
be switched to a disjoint backup path to sustain the flow. 
Existing work for providing reliability to DSA networks and 
M A N E T s assumes the links to fail independently. However, in 
DSA networks, when a single primary user appears, multiple 
DSA links may fail simultaneously if they cause harmful inter-
ference to the same primary user. Thus, the link failures in DSA 
networks are dependent in practice. 
2.3.2 Reliability in Wireline Networks 
Reliability has been studied extensively in wireline networks [13-
17]. Two common approaches are 1+1 protection and shared 
protection. For 1+1 protection, 2 disjoint paths (primary and 
secondary paths) are computed and the data is transmitted 
through both paths. When a failure occurs on the primary path, 
the traffic will be switched to the secondary path. For shared 
protection, it can be deployed as path-based restoration or link-
based restoration. For path-based restoration, a backup path is 
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pre-computed for each end-to-end path. When a failure occurs, 
the traffic can be switched to the backup path. For link-based 
restoration, a detour path is pre-computed for each link. When 
a link failure occurs, the traffic, which is carried by the link, 
will be switched to the detour path. The backup capacity of 
two primary paths can be shared if a single failure cannot affect 
both paths simultaneously. 
16] studies the tradeoffs between the capacity consumption 
and the service reliability among different protection schemes. 
For 1+1 protection, the service reliability is high. However, it 
also consumes high capacity for protection. Shared protection 
can reduce the consumed capacity for protection, but the service 
reliability is not as high as 1+1 protection. 
Some studies treat the reliability as the QoS requirement. 
In [18], it considers the reliable wireline routing problem. Each 
link is associated with a cost. Its objective is to find a path be-
tween source node and destination node such that the reliability 
requirement and the baiidwidtli are satisfied and the cost of the 
path is minimized. The backup paths are only created when the 
primary path cannot satisfy the reliability requirement. 
Two common failure models have been widely studied. These 
are the single failure model and the multiple failures model. For 
the single failure model, the network is protected from single link 
or node failure. In practice, however, the failures can happen 
simultaneously. For example, when several fibers are bundled 
into the same conduit, a cut of the conduit will cause several 
fiber breaks, which result in multiple simultaneous link failures. 
13] and [14] consider the single failure model. In [13], single 
link failure and single node failure are considered. The backup 
path is constructed to protect a link or a node from failure. It 
also considers how to share the backup capacity in the backup 
paths. In [14], it considers restoration with backtracking. It of-
fers the tradeoffs between the backup capacity and the restora-
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tion latency by controlling the so-called backtracking distance 
parameter. 
Recently, the Shared Risk Resource Group (SRRG) [19,20 
model has been introduced to capture multiple failures scenarios. 
As stated in the previous example, the fiber links have the same 
risk to fail if these links are bundled. In such case, the fiber 
links will belong to the same risk group. All elements in the 
same risk group fail simultaneously. Each shared risk group has 
a different failure probability. 
Recent research has considered how to provide protection un-
der the SRRG model. [21] assumes that each link is associated 
with one or more colors. The links with the same color will fail 
simultaneously. Its objective is to maximize the reliability of an 
end-to-end path in a wireline mesh network. If all colors have 
the same failure probability, minimizing the number of colors of 
a path is equivalent to minimizing the failure probability of the 
path. However, finding a path using the minimum number of 
colors has proven to be NP-complete. [21] also shows that it is 
NP-complete to find two link-disjoint paths from a source node 
to a destination node using the minimum number of colors. 
The link failure model in DSA networks is closely related to 
the Shared Risk Link model. In DSA networks, if two links can 
cause harmful interference to a primary user, these two links are 
in the same shared risk group. 
However, there are two fiiiidainental differences between wire-
line protection and DSA protection. First, as the primary users 
appear in random location, the definition of the resultant shared 
risk link group in DSA networks is much more complex. Sec-
ond, in the wireline networks, the link failure is caused by an 
unrecoverable event, such as a fiber cut. Therefore, a physically 
disjoint backup path is often needed to restore the physical link 
between two nodes. In DSA networks, link failure is caused by 
the presence of primary user(s). The link can be restored by 
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switching to another unoccupied channel. Therefore, no physi-
cally diverse path is needed as long as an alternative frequency 
channel is available for the original link. 
2.4 Capacity Planning in Wireless Mesh Net-
works 
It is necessary to check whether the path has enough capacity to 
carry a given traffic flow. As the transmissions share the wireless 
medium, a transmission between two nodes will interfere with 
the neighboring transmissions. Therefore, an interference model 
should be defined in order to capture the interference between 
the transmissions. 
Below, we review several common interference models found 
in the literature. Based on these interference models, a set of 
link capacity constraints can be defined to check whether a link 
has enough residual capacity to carry a given traffic flow. 
In wireless networks, multiple links using the same frequency 
channel will share its capacity. Having enough capacity on an 
individual link does not guarantee that the end-to-end path can 
carry the traffic. We review some existing approaches for finding 
capacity feasible path in multi-hop wireless networks. We will 
also review the related works in optimal capacity allocation. 
2.4.1 Interference Model 
Two interference models are discussed in [22] They are the pro-
tocol model and the physical model. For the protocol model, 
two nodes can communicate with each other if their distance is 
less than the transmission range Rj\ Two nodes may interfere 
with each other if the distance between them is less than the 
interference range Rj. For the physical model, a transmission is 
successful if the sigiial-to-noise-and-interference ratio (SINR) at 
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the receiver is higher than a threshold. 
23] extends the protocol model by applying 802.11 Media 
Access Control protocol (CSMA with RTS/CTS/ACK). Given 
two nodes u and v, a node will interfere with the transmission 
between u and v if it is within Rj of either u and v. Therefore, 
a link I2 = (^ 2^，”2) is in the interfering set of h = {ui^ vi) if the 
distance between one of the four pairs of nodes {ui, 1^ 2), (t»i，1^2)， 
{ui, V2) and {vi,v2) is less than Rj. 
2.4.2 Link Capacity Constraint 
In wireless networks, if assigned to the same channel, multiple 
neighboring links will interfere with each other and share the 
channel capacity. Given a set of links using the same channel, 
and given the link flow on each link, we want to know whether 
it is feasible for the network to carry the flows. Let 1(1) be 
the set of links that can interfere with link I. Let f{l) be the 
amount of traffic flow on link I. Let h be the capacity of the 
channel assigned to link I. In [23], the sufficient condition to 




This condition states that the total traffic of a link and its 
interfering links should be less than the channel capacity. Notice 
that Equation (2.2) is sufficient but not necessary: there can be 
cases where Equation (2.2) is violated but the links can still 
carry the corresponding offered load on each simultaneously. 
An alternative approach for finding capacity-feasible path is 
to rely on empirical measurements. For instance, [1] uses a mea-
surement based model to check the capacity feasibility. It first 
constructs an interference map by measuring the interference 
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between nodes. It then computes the residual capacity through 
the interference map. 
2.4.3 Feasible Path 
In wireline networks, given a path, if all the links have enough 
capacity to carry the traffic, the path is also capacity feasible. 
However, in wireless networks, the links using same frequency 
channel interfere with each other. Even if all links on a path can 
carry the traffic independently, the path may still be infeasible 
to carry an end to end flow. It is because two links on the path 
may compete for the same residual channel capacity. 
1] develops a polynomial time algorithm to find a capacity-
feasible path. It checks the capacity feasibility of a sequence of 
links, which is referred to as a path segment. It shows that if 
an end-to-end path is formed by a set of capacity-feasible path 
segments, the end-to-end path will likely be capacity-feasible. 
Based on this observation, it forms a so-called "Edge graph" 
based on the original topology of the wireless network. Each 
node in the Edge graph represents a feasible path segment. It 
then runs the shortest path algorithm on the Edge graph to 
obtain a capacity-feasible path. 
2.4.4 Optimal Capacity Allocation in DSA Networks 
and Wireless Mesh Networks 
Optimal capacity allocation has been studied in both DSA net-
works [24-26] and wireless mesh networks [23,27,28]. Given a 
wireless mesh network and a set of end-to-end traffic flow de-
mands, the common objective is to maximize the network ca-
pacity by considering the channel assignment, routing, and even 
the radio interface assignment. [23] gives a mathematical pro-
gramming formulation for this problem. 
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One of the differences between wireless mesh networks and 
DSA networks is that in wireless mesh networks, each radio in-
terface can only operate on a single channel. Also, the number 
of radio interfaces per node is limited. However, DSA devices 
are usually associated with cognitive radios which are capable 
of using multiple frequency channels to communicate with each 
other concurrently [25]. Therefore, the number of concurrent 
channels between two nodes is typically not limited by the num-
ber of radio interfaces. 
25] gives an integer programming formulation for multi-hop 
DSA networks. It develops a centralized algorithm to obtain 
a near-optimal solution to minimize the spectrum resource for 
a set of end-to-end flows. However, it does not consider the 
dynamics of the presence of primary users. When a primary user 
appears, the existing flows on the affected DSA links simply get 
dropped. 
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2.5 Chapter Summary 
In this chapter, we have given a brief introduction for DSA net-
works. The common approaches to model the spectrum avail-
ability of unlicensed users have been discussed. 
While there have been extensive studies on supporting relia-
bility in wireline and wireless networks, there are fundamental 
differences for the case of DSA networks. Firstly, previous ap-
proaches usually assume the failures occur independently, while 
multiple DSA links can fail simultaneously when a single pri-
mary user appears. Secondly, link failures are often caused by 
an unrecoverable event in M A N E T s and wireline networks, while 
a DSA link can be recovered by switching to another unoccupied 
spectrum band. 
W e have also reviewed the approaches to check the capacity 
feasibility of an end-to-end path in a multi-hop wireless net-
work. Based on the interference model and capacity feasibility 
constraints, the maximum allowable load can be determined. 
• End of chapter. 
Chapter 3 
Lifetime Aware Routing 
without Backup 
3.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, we focus on providing end-to-end reliability of a 
DSA path without backup protection. A path without backup 
protection fails if any one of its links is interrupted by a primary 
user. Although no backup protection is provided, the lifetime 
of a path can be increased significantly with judicious route 
selection. 
In the following sections, we first discuss the system model 
for DSA networks. Then we discuss the lifetime distribution 
of a path without backup protection. Computing the lifetime 
distribution of a path requires a large amount of node location 
information which may not be available in practice. This mo-
tivates us to propose the Chain Approximation which gives a 
tight upper bound for the failure probability of a path, while 
requiring only the link' length instead of exact node location 
information. The problem of finding maximum lifetime path 
is proven to be NP-hard. We therefore design three heuristics, 
namely, “Miiiimmn Weight", "Greedy" and "GACA" to find a 
"long" lifetime path. The performance of these heuristics is eval-
uated and compared through simulation under various network 
19 
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Figure 3.1: The vulnerable area of a DSA link 
configurations. 
3.2 System Model 
Due to the capability of DSA devices, a DSA node is capable of 
using multiple frequency channels to communicate with another 
node concurrently. Therefore, there exist multiple logical links 
between two nodes. We assume that each logical link I G L has 
been assigned one channel c e C. 
W e assume that each primary user occupies one and one only 
channel c e C. We use the same approach as [6] to abstract the 
spectrum availability. If the distance between a primary receiver 
of channel c and a DSA transmitter is less than the protection 
radius the DSA transmitter cannot use channel c. The pro-
tection radius Rp can be different for different channels. W e 
define the "vulnerable area" of the DSA transmitter as a circle 
centered at the DSA transmitter with the radius given by Rp. 
When a primary user of channel c appears in the vulnerable 
area of a DSA transmitter using channel c, the DSA transmitter 
needs to stop using channel c. Both nodes of a DSA link need 
to transmit packets (either data packet or A C K packet). There-
fore, if a primary user appears in one of the vulnerable areas of 
the DSA nodes, the link will be interrupted. Figure 3.1 shows 
the vulnerable area of a DSA link, given by the union of the 
vulnerable areas of its two terminating nodes. 
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(a) The topology of a path 
、 ^ ^ A 
w处 
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(b) Union of the vulnerable areas of different 
channels 
Figure 3.2: An example showing the total vulnerable area of a path 
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A single DSA path is formed by a set of DSA links, which 
can be different channels. Under this model, the total vulnerable 
area of a path is given by the sum of the union of the vulnerable 
areas of the links using the same channel. Let Ac be the union 
of the vulnerable areas of a path's links which use channel c. 
Then the total vulnerable area of a path is equal to Ac. For 
example, Figure 3.2(a) shows a path which is formed by a set 
of links using different channels. Then the corresponding total 
vulnerable area of the path is shown in Figure 3.2(b), which is 
the sum of the union of the vulnerable areas of different channels 
(i.e. AI^A2 + AS). 
W e assume the arrivals of primary users of channel c follow 
the Poisson distribution with rate Ac per unit area per unit time. 
W e also assume that Ac is given as a system parameter. In 
practice, it can be derived from the statistical usage of licensed 
band. 
The "lifetime" of a DSA path is defined as the length of time 
before a DSA flow is interrupted. Our reliability requirement 
is specified in form of the following probabilistic guarantee such 
that: 
尸[Lifetime of the flow < T ] < p (3.1) 
for some specified duration T. P[Lifetime < T] is the "failure 
probability of a path". For example, given the target failure 
probability p — 0.01, a path having the guaranteed lifetime of 
lOOsec will experience less than 1% of the cases to have a lifetime 
shorter than lOOsec. 
3.3 Lifetime Distribution of a Path without 
Backup Protection 
In this section, we first find out the exact lifetime distribution 
of a path without backup protection. We then investigate the 
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upper bound for the failure probability of a path. 
3.3.1 Exact Lifetime Distribution 
Let Ac be area of the union of the vulnerable regions-of all the 
links using channel c along a path P. Assume that the arrivals of 
primary users to channel c follow the Poisson distribution with 
rate Ac per unit area per unit time. 
W e want to find out the lifetime distribution of P. When a 
primary user appears and occupies the channel of a link, the link 
will switch to a new channel. It is not guaranteed that the new 
channel has enough capacity to carry the traffic of the link, so 
the end-to-end flows carrying on the link are interrupted. Under 
this model, the lifetime of a path depends on the arrival rate of 
primary users, but it does not depend on the "holding time" of 
the primary user. Because once the channel is occupied, the link 
switches to a new channel. Therefore, the length of time that 
the original channel will be occupied does not affect the lifetime 
of the path. The holding time of primary users will affect the 
number of channels a link can choose to switch in. 
Proposition 3.1. The lifetime of a path without backup protec-
tion follows the exponential distribution of rate EeAcAc. 
Proof. Given the total vulnerable area, of all the links using 
channel c along P，the arrival time of the first primary user of 
this channel into this area follows an exponential distribution of 
rate XqAc. A S a result, the arrival time of the first primary user 
on any channel used by the links of P will follow an exponential 
distribution of rate Ac丸 which, by definition, is equivalent 
to the lifetime distribution of P if no backup is provided. • 
For a given target lifetime T，the failure probability of a path 
P is given by: 
巧Lifetime of P g T] = 1 — e - ( 3 . 2 ) 
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(a) Original topology 
(b) Chain Approximation topology 
Figure 3.3: The Chain Approximation of a path 
W e will call JIlc 入cA； as the interrupt rate of a path. Intu-
itively, when the vulnerable area is small, it is unlikely that a 
primary user will appear in the vulnerable area. Also, if the ar-
rival rate of primary users is low, it is unlikely that the path will 
be interrupted before a DSA flow on it finishes its transmission. 
To find a path of "long" lifetime, the route selection algorithm 
should therefore try to minimize the total "weighted vulnerable 
area" of the path, where the weight is the primary user arrival 
rate into the corresponding frequency channel. 
3.3.2 The Chain Approximation 
Calculating the exact vulnerable area Ac has two difficulties. 
First, it requires considerable computation time. Second, it re-
quires the knowledge of the exact locations of the nodes along 
a path. Therefore, it is beneficial to design an approximation of 
the lifetime of a path without requiring the exact node location 
information. Assume that we only have the distances between 
nodes (but not their locations) along a path, we can still de-
rive an upper bound for the failure probability of the path with 
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Figure 3.4: The green area shows the difference between the exact vulnerable 
area and that of the Chain Approximation 
respect to a target lifetime. Figure 3.3 illustrates such approx-
imation approach. Figure 3.3(a) shows the original path and 
Figure 3.3(b) is its "straightened" (Chain Approximation) ver-
sion. In Figure 3.3(a) and Figure 3.3(b), the distances between 
two consecutive nodes along the path are the same. Below, we 
will show that the union of the areas in Figure 3.3(b) is always 
larger than that of Figure 3.3(a). As a result, we can prove that 
the failure probability of a path can be upper-bounded via the 
Chain Approximation. 
Theorem 3.1. Given a path with a set of links, all of the same 
length, the failure probability of the original path is upper-hounded 
by that of its Chain Approximation version. 
The proof is given in Appendix A. If we do not have the 
information of distances between nodes, we can use the commu-
nication range of each DSA link to compute an upper bound for 
the path failure probability. 
Notice that under the chain topology, a node's vulnerable 
area will only overlap with the vulnerable area of the nodes 
which is at most one hop away. This is to be contrast to the 
case of the original topology where a node's vulnerable area 
can overlap with the vulnerable areas of nodes which are more 
than one hop away. Note that the larger the overlapping area, 
the smaller the total vulnerable area. As a result, the Chain 
Approximation always corresponds to larger vulnerable area and 
thus higher path failure probability. 
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If all links are assigned to different channels, vulnerable areas 
of consecutive links will be likely to be non-overlapping with 
each other (provided that the protection radius not excessively 
large). In this case, the Chain Approximation gives the exact 
value of vulnerable area. The bound provided by the Chain 
Approximation is the loosest when all the links along a path are 
assigned to the same frequency channel, resulting in maximum 
overlapping of vulnerable areas for consecutive links on a path. 
Under typical network configurations, the Chain Approxima-
tion should provide a tight bound for the total vulnerable area 
of the original path. Let us illustrate this using Figure 3.4. The 
difference of the vulnerable area between the original exact path 
and its Chain Approximation is the sum of the green area shown 
in the figure, which is negligible compared to the entire vulner-
able area. The tightness of Chain Approximation bound will be 
quantified through simulation in Section 3.5.1. 
3.4 Route Selection without Backup Protec-
tion 
According to the analysis presented in the previous sections, 
given a path, we can find out its lifetime distribution. In this 
section, we focus on how to find a path with the niaxirrmm 
lifetime between two given nodes in a DSA network. 
3.4.1 NP-Hardness of Finding Maximum Lifetime Path 
Consider the following problem PI: Given a DSA network G — 
(A/“, L), where N is the set of nodes and L is the set of links. Let 
(xi, Ui) be the coordinates of node i. Given the set of channels 
C — {ci, C2，…，c/(} where K is the total number of channels 
used by links in G. Denote the protection radius for channel c 
by Rp. Assume that each link I G L has been assigned with 
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one frequency channel q G C. Our objective is to find a single 
path from a source node s to a destination node d which has the 
maximum lifetime amongst all possible paths between s and d. 
Unfortunately, it can be shown that: 
Theorem 3.2. PI is NP-hard. 
Proof. Consider the Minimum-Color Single Path problem, P2 
21] as follows: Given a network G = (A^ , L), where N is the 
set of nodes and L is the set of links. Given the set of colors 
C 二 {ci，C2, ...，c/(} where K is the maximum number of colors 
in G，and a color assignment of q G C for every link I. P2 will 
find a path from source node s to destination node d such that 
it uses the minimum number of colors amongst its link. In [21], 
P2 has been proven to be NP-complete. 
To prove the NP-hardness of PI, we will show that the Minimum-
Color Single Path problem P2, can be transformed to be an in-
stance of PI using the following settings. First, the protection 
radius Rp of each DSA link is set to be large enough to cover the 
entire DSA network. As such, when a primary user of channel c 
appears, all links using channel c will be interrupted. Therefore, 
all links in the network using channel c will belong to the same 
shared risk group. Second, the arrival rate of primary users 
for every frequency channel is set to be equal to same constant 
value. Thus, each frequency channel has the same probability 
to be occupied. Under these settings, PI becomes the problem 
of finding a source-to-destination path with minimum number 
of channels (colors). If we can find a solution to solve PI under 
these settings, we can also find the solution to every Minimum-
Color Single Path problem P2 in general. Since P2 is known to 
be NP-complete, P\ is therefore NP-hard. 
• 
Since PI has been proven to be NP-hard, in the following 
sections, we will design different heuristics to find an mipro-
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tected DSA path with "long" lifetime between a given pair of 
source/destination nodes. 
3.4.2 The Minimum Weight Algorithm 
Algorithm 1 DSAMin_Weight(Graph G, source s, destination d, flow f ) 
1： for all link I e G do 
2: Set the link weight as Ac^c 
3： end for 
4: GE — Edge_Graph(G, s, d, f) / / T o construct a graph to find capacity 
feasible path 
5: Use the shortest path algorithm to find the minimum weight path P' 
from s to dm GE 
6： return P == Transform_Path(P') / / T o transform the path from edge 
graph to original graph 
Prom the expression of the lifetime distribution of a path 
given in Equation (3.2), we know that the lower the interrupt 
rate (i.e. ^c^c), the longer the lifetime of the path. There-
fore, our first heuristic is to use the interrupt rate Ac入 of each 
DSA link as the link metric to compute the shortest path be-
tween a given pair of nodes (using the Dijkstra algorithm). 
Besides finding a long lifetime path, we also need to ensure 
that there is enough capacity along the path to carry the re-
quested traffic flow. Towards this end, we have extended the 
call-admission-control algorithm proposed by [1] to handle such 
task. The details of finding a capacity-feasible path will be dis-
cussed in Section 5.2. Algorithm 1 gives a detail flow-chart of 
the Minimum Weight Algorithm for finding a path with a long 
lifetime. 
3.4.3 Greedy Algorithm 
An advantage of the Minimum Weight Algorithm is its low com-
putational complexity. Furthermore, since the algorithm uses 
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Figure 3.5: The "overlapping area" effect 
the interrupt rate as the link metric in computing a shortest 
path, it will choose a path consisting of links with small vul-
nerable area and low primary user arrival rate. However, the 
Minimum Weight Algorithm has the limitation that the links 
along the path are chosen "independently" without considering 
the maximization of overlapping vulnerable areas between con-
secutive links along the path. Consider the case in Figure 3.5. 
Given two paths which have the same link-topology but different 
link channel assignments, one should choose the path in Figure 
3.5(b) over that of Figure 3.5(a) to get a longer lifetime path. 
In Figure 3.5(b), since the channels are the same for both links, 
the vulnerable areas of the two links overlap with each other 
and thus results in smaller total vulnerable area for the path. 
In contrast, the links of the path shown in Figure 3.5(a) use 
different frequency channels. As such, the vulnerable areas of 
the consecutive links do not overlap and leads to an increase 
in the overall vulnerable area for the path. Motivated by this 
observation, we propose another route selection heuristic called 
the Greedy Algorithm which tries to select a path consisting of 
links involving a fewer number of channels. 
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The Greedy Algorithm is a modification of the Dijkstra short-
est path algorithm. For the Dijkstra algorithm, after a vertex v 
is marked as visited, it will carry a label equal to the minimum 
cost of reaching v from the source. The algorithm then searches 
its neighboring vertices and calculates the cost of reaching the 
neighboring vertex by adding the link cost to the vertex v's cost. 
For the proposed Greedy Algorithm, after a vertex v is marked 
as visited, it will store the entire path py from the source to v. 
A search is then performed on the neighboring vertices of v to 
calculate the cost of reaching each neighboring vertex by recom-
puting the interrupt rate h Ac^c of the resultant path formed 
by the path py and the link between v and the corresponding 
neighboring node. As before, the cost of a link will be based on 
its weighted vulnerable area. However, the effect of overlapping 
of vulnerable areas amongst consecutive links will be considered 
by the Greedy Algorithm during path selection. 
Algorithm 2 shows the details of the Greedy Algorithm. Again, 
we will construct an auxiliary “Edge graph" {GE) for checking 
the capacity-feasibility of a path. path[v] stores the selected 
path from the source to the node v. CaLRate(u,v) computes 
the interrupt rate ^ ^ XcAc of the path formed by the path py 
and the link between the current node and the target neighbor. 
The Greedy Algorithm can also be used to implicitly deter-
mine the frequency assignments for the active and backup chan-
nels of a link if more than two frequency channels are available 
and no existing traffic flow is using the link. As an illustrative 
example, consider a DSA link which has n available frequency 
channels. W e can replace the link by n logical links in the 
graph, each representing one frequency channel. When we use 
the Greedy Algorithm to select a long lifetime path, the "best" 
logical links will be included as part of the path, which implic-
itly select the frequency assignments for the active and backup 
channel of the link. However, if other traffic flows already exist 
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Algorithm 2 DSAGreedy_Algorithm(Graph G, source s, destination d, flow 
N 
1： GE = Edge_Graph(G, s, d, f) / / T o construct a graph to find capacity 
feasible path 
2： for all node v e Ge do 
3： mstM = INFINITY 
4： path[i;] = NULL 
5： end for 
6： cost [St] 二 0 //st represents the source node in edge graph 
7: 1/ = V{GE) 
8： while V is not empty do 
9： u = Extract_Min(V) 
10： for all neighbor f of u do 
11： rate = CaLRate(?i,?;) 
12： if rate < cost[？；] then 
13： cost[v] = rate 
14： path[?;] = path[ii]©t' 
15： end if 
16： end for 
17： end while 
18： return P = Transform_Path(path[cy) //dt represents the destination 
node in edge graph 
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Figure 3.6: T h e additional vulnerable area of link (c, d) 
on the link, we may not be able to change the assigned frequency 
for the active channel as this will cause unnecessary interruption 
of those flows. 
Comparing with the Minimum Weight Algorithm, the Greedy 
Algorithm has two disadvantages. First, higher complexity is 
needed for computing the exact vulnerable areas of the path. 
Second, the exact locations of all nodes are needed in order to 
compute the total vulnerable area. To address these difficulties, 
we propose another algorithm by combining the Greedy Algo-
rithm with the Chain Approximation idea introduced in Section 
3.4.4. 
3.4.4 G A C A - The Greedy Algorithm using the Chain 
Approximation 
For the basic Greedy Algorithm, in order to compute the addi-
tional vulnerable area of a link, the locations of all other nodes 
are needed. For example, in Figure 3.6, after the vertex c is 
marked as visited, we will know the "shortest" path from the 
source a to c，i.e., a — b — c. Then vertex c will search its 
neighboring vertex, which is d, and compute the interrupt rate 
X^c Ac入.In order to compute the additional vulnerable area Ai 
and A2 in Figure 3.6(a), the information regarding the locations 
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of a and b is needed. However, with the Chain Approximation in 
Figure 3.6(b), if we know the distance of the previous node using 
channel 1 (which is the distance of link (6, c) in this example), 
we can compute Ai. Similarly, we can compute A2 using the 
length of the link (c, d). As a result, exact node location infor-
mation is not needed with the Chain Approximation. Only the 
information about the lengths of the links will suffice. In the ab-
sence of link-length information, we can even use the maximum 
transmission range of a DSA link to provide an upper-bound of 
the corresponding vulnerable area (and thus path failure prob-
ability). 
Algorithm 3 shows the details of GACA. CaLAdditional-Rate 
calculates the incremental interrupt rate 入c八 along the path. 
PreDist[v,c] stores the distance between vertex v and the pre-
vious node using channel c. Using the value of PreDist[v,c], we 
can compute the increase in vulnerable area along a path {Ai as 
shown in Figure 3.6(b)). 
3.5 Simulation Results 
In this section, we first investigate the tightness of the Chain Ap-
proximation for computing the vulnerable area of a path. Then 
we study under what conditions G A C A gives a significant im-
provement on path lifetime when compared with the Minimum 
Weight Algorithm. 
3.5.1 Tightness of the Chain Approximation Bound for 
Vulnerable Area 
W e show the tightness of the Chain Approximation Bound through 
simulation. W e simulate a network which covers an area of 500m 
X 500m. The communication range of each DSA link is 100m. 
Interference range between DSA nodes is 200m. Protection ra-
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Algorithm 3 DSA_GACA(Graph G, source s, destination d, flow f) 
1： GE = Edge_Graph(G, s, d, f) / / T o construct a graph to find capacity 
feasible path 
2： for all node v e Ge do 
3： costM 二 INFINITY 
4: PreDist[7;,c] = INFINITY 
5： Pre Vert [?;] = NULL 
6： end for 
7： cost[sf] = 0 
8: V = ViGE) 
9： while V is not empty do 
10： u = Extract_Min(y) 
11： for all neighbor ？; of w do 
12： rate = cost[ii] + Cal_Additional_Rate(f, PreDist[u,channel of v]) 
13： if rate < cost [I/] then 
14： cost[f) = rate 
15: PreVert[t'] = u 
16： for all c G C do 
17： if c 二 channel of v then 
18： PreDist[v,c] = 0 
19： else 
20： PreDistlfjC] = PreDist[u,c] + the length of link represented 
by V. 
21: end if 
22： end for 
23： end if 
24： end for 
25: end while 
26: return P = Transform—Path (Pre Vert [j) / / T o transform the path from 
edge graph to original graph 
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Figure 3.7: The distribution of the percentage difference between the exact 
vulnerable area of a path and its Chain Approximation when the protection 
radius is 200m 
Table 3.1: The percentage difference between the exact vulnerable area of a 
path and its Chain Approximation under different protection radii 
一 Protection Radius (m) 100 200 300 400 
Average percentage difference (%) 0.600 1.539 1.546 1.365 
dius for a primary user is 200m. 10 orthogonal frequency chan-
nels are available (C = 10) for each link. The primary user ar-
rival rate is 1 x 1 0 ~ f o r each channel. The topology is 
shown in Figure 3.9(b). In order to investigate the performance 
of the Chain Approximation under the worst case, all links are 
assigned to the same channel. 1000 source-destination pairs are 
selected randomly and their shortest paths are found. The exact 
vulnerable area of each shortest path and its Chain Approxima-
tion bound are computed. The distribution of the percentage 
difference is shown in Figure 3.7. 
Ill 68.9% of all results, the percentage difference is less than 
2%. The percentage difference is more than 4% in 6.2% of the 
cases.. The maximum percentage difference in all 1000 cases is 
10.35%. The average percentage difference is 1.54%. 
Table 3.1 shows the average percentage difference between the 
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Figure 3.8: The distribution of the percentage change of guaranteed lifetime 
when using GACA to replace the Greedy Algorithm 
exact area of a path and its Chain Approximation under different 
protection radii. It shows the average percentage differences 
remain low (less than 1.6%) for different protection radii. All 
these results confirm that the Chain Approximation provides a 
tight bound for computing the vulnerable area of a path under 
typical network configurations. 
3.5.2 Comparison between Greedy and GACA using 
Guaranteed Lifetime 
W e compare the performance of the Greedy Algorithm and G A C A 
in selecting paths with long lifetime. Figure 3.8 shows the per-
centage change of guaranteed path lifetime when G A C A is used 
to replace the basic Greedy Algorithm with the target failure 
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Figure 3.9: Different node densities 
probability set to 0.01. For 78.4% of the cases, the guaranteed 
lifetimes of the paths selected by the Greedy Algorithm and 
G A C A are the same. The percentage decrease in path lifetime 
guarantee provided by G A C A is less than 2% for more than 90% 
of all cases. These results show that the performance of G A C A 
in selecting long lifetime path is very close to the basic Greedy 
Algorithm. 
In a very few number of cases (out of the 1000 cases), the 
guaranteed lifetime of a path selected by G A C A is longer than 
that found by the Greedy Algorithm. Since both algorithms use 
slightly different heuristics to "rank" the available paths, it is 
possible, though unlikely, for G A C A to find a longer lifetime 
path than the basic Greedy Algorithm. 
3.5.3 Factors impacting the performance of GACA 
W e investigate the conditions under which G A C A can lead to 
significant increase of guaranteed lifetime when compared with 
the Minimum Weight Algorithm. 
In this simulation, one channel is assigned to each link ran-
domly. 1000 source-destination node-pairs are selected randomly 
and the Minimum Weight Algorithm and G A C A are used to se-
lect paths for each source-destination pair. Given the target 
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Figure 3.10: Node Density 
failure probability p = 0.01, we compare the guaranteed lifetime 
of the paths selected by the two algorithms. 
Effect of Node Density 
W e investigate the impact of node density to the performance 
of GACA. W e consider three random network topologies with 
different node densities - low, medium and high, which are shown 
in Figure 3.9. Figure 3.10 shows the cumulative distribution of 
the percentage increase of the guaranteed lifetime of the paths 
selected by the Minimum Weight Algorithm and GACA. For the 
low density network, only 26.9% of the cases have more than 
50% increase in guaranteed lifetime. For the medium density 
network, 56.9% of the cases have more than 50% increase in 
guaranteed lifetime. For the high density one, 79.6% of the 
simulation cases have more than 50% increase in guaranteed 
lifetime. It shows that G A C A is beneficial when the node density 
is high. This is because higher node density leads to increase of 
choices of paths for the algorithm. 
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Figure 3.11: Number of logical links between nodes 
Effect of Number of Logical Links between Nodes 
W e also study the effect of the number of logical links between 
two neighboring nodes. The results are shown in Figure 3.11. 
Due to the capability of DSA devices, each device is capable 
of using multiple channels to communicate with a neighboring 
node. It is observed that when compared with the Minimum 
Weight Algorithm, G A C A increases the guaranteed lifetime sig-
nificantly when the number of logical links between nodes in-
creases, which it turn gives G A C A more choices in selecting a 
better path. 
Effect of Protection Radius 
Figure 3.12 depicts the effect of the protection radius on the per-
formance of GACA. When the protection radius is short (100m), 
the overlapping vulnerable area between the consecutive DSA 
links along a path is small. Thus the "overlapping area effect" 
discussed in Section 3.4.3 is not significant. As a result there 
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Figure 3.12: Protection Radius 
is little difference between the Minimum Weight Algorithm and 
GACA. For the "100m" case, only 24.2% of all simulation cases 
have more than 50% increase in guaranteed lifetime when G A C A 
is used instead of the Minimum Weight Algorithm. As the pro-
tection radius increases to 300m, the overlapping vulnerable area 
becomes large. Thus GACA, by considering the overlapping 
area effect, can reduce the total vulnerable area of a path signif-
icantly. As shown in Figure 3.12, for the "300m" case, 59.1% of 
all simulation cases have more than 50% increase in guaranteed 
path lifetime. 
Effect of Hop Count between Source and Destination Nodes 
W e investigate the relationship between the percentage increase 
and the hop count of source and destination nodes. W e gen-
erate 1000 source destination pairs with the same shortest hop 
distance and calculate the average, maximum and minimum per-
centage increase of the paths selected by the Minimum Weight 
Algorithm and GACA. The results are shown in Figure 3.13. We 
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Figure 3.13: The relationship between the percentage increase of guaranteed 
lifetime and the hop count of source and destination nodes 
notice that if the hop distance between the source and destina-
tion nodes is longer, the advantage of G A C A over the Minimum 
Weight Algorithm becomes bigger. According to the overlap-
ping area effect, the total vulnerable area can be reduced sub-
stantially if the links use fewer channels. When the hop distance 
is high, the Minimum Weight Algorithm has a higher chance to 
select a path using more channels. G A C A considers the over-
lapping area effect so that it keeps selecting fewer channels to 
form the path. W e also notice that if the hop distance is very 
long (8-10 hops), the percentage increase drops. It is because 
of the network size, very few end-to-end paths are more than 8 
hops. Few choices of paths result lower percentage increase. 
G A C A gives little improvement for the source destination 
pairs with short hop distance. Fortunately, usually the shorter 
the path, the longer its lifetime. In this sense, G A C A can im-
prove the lifetime of paths with large hop-count (where opti-
mization is most needed). For paths with small hop-count, the 
required lifetime may automatically be satisfied by most feasible 
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paths and optimization by G A C A does not play an important 
role anyway. 
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3.6 Chapter Summary 
In this chapter, we have focused on improving the reliability 
for the end-to-end paths of a DSA network without backup 
protection. W e have investigated the lifetime distribution of 
a path without backup protection. A tight upper bound for the 
path failure probability has been derived through the proposed 
Chain Approximation, which provides an efficient way for check-
ing whether the selected path satisfies the lifetime requirement 
with knowing the exact locations of each node. 
W c have proven that the problem of finding the maximum 
lifetime path in a DSA network is NP-hard. Three heuris-
tics have been designed to find a "long" lifetime path (Mini-
m u m Weight, Greedy and GACA) for a given pair of source-
destination. 
The Minimum Weight Algorithm has the lowest complexity. 
However, it does not consider the overlapping effect, while the 
Greedy Algorithm considers this effect and thus it can find a 
better path. But the path selected by the Greedy Algorithm 
usually has longer hop distance, which consumes more network 
capacity. 
W e have also combined the Greedy Algorithm with the Chain 
Approximation to eliminate the need of node location informa-
tion while still capturing the vulnerable area overlapping effect. 
We have investigated under what conditions G A C A prolongs 
the lifetime significantly, which are higher node density, more 
logical links between nodes, longer protection radius, and longer 
hop distance between source and destination nodes. 
• End of chapter. 
Chapter 4 
Prolonging Path Lifetime with 
Backup Channel 
4.1 Introduction 
The lifetime of a path without backup protection may not be 
able to satisfy a given reliability requirement even the maximum 
lifetime path is selected. This is particularly true for DSA appli-
cations with long holding-time, e.g. video conferencing call. For-
tunately, the lifetime can be further increased by pre-assigning 
a backup channel to each DSA link. When a primary user ap-
pears and occupies the active channel, the link can switch to the 
backup channel and continue the transmission. Some capacity 
of the backup channel should be reserved in order to accommo-
date the increased traffic when the link switches to the backup 
channel. 
Let the flow demand of a DSA flow be f Mbps. Each link 
of the path should have at least f Mbps capacity on the active 
channels to carry the traffic. Besides that, each link should 
reserve the same amount of capacity on the backup channel. 
Reserving backup capacity can lead to the reduction of avail-
able network capacity. To address this problem, the backup 
capacity should be shared with the neighboring links whenever 
possible. In this chapter, we first discuss the Non-Shared Backup 
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scheme. Then we discuss the Shared Backup scheme in Section 
4.3. 
4.2 Non-Shared Backup Protection 
In this part, we first study the lifetime distribution of a path 
under the Non-Shared Backup scheme. Then we design a route 
selection algorithm based on such protection. 
4.2.1 Lifetime of a Path with Non-Shared Backup 
Let T^ (T^) be the lifetime of the active (backup) channel of a 
link I of a path P respectively. We also overload P to represent 
the set of all links belonging to the path. With such backup 
protection, the lifetime of link I is given by max{T^, Tg} and the 
lifetime of the path is equal to min/ep{max{T^, T^}}. Given a 
target lifetime requirement T, the failure probability of the path 
under such backup protection is therefore: 
P[min{max{Tj,,T^}}<T] (4.1) 
Since the vulnerable areas of active and backup channels of 
different links along the path can overlap with each other, the 
lifetimes of individual links are actually not independent. Due 
to such dependency, it is difficult to compute the exact failure 
probability of a path in general. Below, we will derive an upper 
bound for the failure probability of a path instead. 
Theorem 4.1. An upper bound for the failure probability of a 
path with backup is given by: 
1 — JJ(1 - P[T丄 < r]P[T^ < T]) (4.2) 
LEP 
The proof is given in Appendix B. Notice that the expression 
in Equation 4.2 is equivalent to the failure probability of the path 
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when there is no overlapping between the vulnerable areas of its 
links. 
Let A J, be the vulnerable area of the active channel c of link 
I. According to the Poisson arrival assumption of primary users, 
we have: 
P p l < T] - 1 - e-、乂r (4.3) 
Similarly, we have 
<T] = 1- e-、々 （4.4) 
where B^ , is the vulnerable area of the backup channel c of link 
I. Substituting these into Theorem 4.1，we have: 
P [lifetime of a path P under non-shared backup protection < T 
<1 — JJ(1 - < T]P[T^b < T]) 
LEP 
二 1 - JJ(1 - (1 — e-、4a了)（1 — e-、AT)) 
LEP 
=1 — ； + e-�AT - 试 … (4.5) 
LEP 
Proposition 4.1. The upper bound for the failure probability 
with Non-Shared Backup is: 
1 - - 、 々 + e - W 一 (4.6) 
LEP 
4.2.2 Route Selection for paths with Non-Shared Backup 
W e use the logarithm transformation approach in [7] to derive 
the link weight for shortest path computation. By taking the 
logarithm of the upper bound of the failure probability of link 
I, its link weight becomes: 
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which can be used by the shortest path algorithm to find a long 
lifetime path under the Non-Shared Backup scheme. Algorithm 
4 shows the detail steps of finding an end-to-end path under the 
Non-Shared Backup scheme. 
minimize 1 — ^ [{1 - < T]P[T^ < T]) 
leP 
<^maximize — < T]P[T^ < T]) 
leP 
分minimize < T]P[T^ < T]) 
leP 
Algorithm 4 DSANon_Shared_Backup_Path(Graph G, source s, destination 
d, flow / ) 
1： for all link I e G do ^ : 
2： Set the link weight as - Z n ( e - � 4 „ : r + g-^ c^B .^T _ 
3： end for 
4： Ge = Edge_Graph(G, s, d � f ) / / T o construct a graph to find capacity 
feasible path 
5： Use the shortest path algorithm to find the inininmin weight path P' 
from s to d in GE 
6： return P = Ti-ansform_Path(P') / / T o transform the path from edge 
graph to original graph 
4.3 Shared Backup Protection 
In some situation, backup capacity can be shared with the neigh-
boring links to reduce the required capacity reservation. In 
this section, we first discuss how the backup capacity can be 
shared. Then we derive the lifetime distribution for paths with 
the Shared Backup and propose a route selection algorithm for 
such protection scheme. 
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4.3.1 Sharing of Backup Capacity 
Any pair of links having different active channels but the same 
backup channel in some neighborhood will not use their shared 
backup simultaneously unless both of their active channels are 
occupied by the corresponding primary users. Consider the net-
work in Figure 4.1(b) as an illustrative example. The num-
ber outside (inside) the bracket represents the assigned active 
(backup) channel number for each link. Assume that the in-
terfering links [a, b) and (c, d) both require 5 units of capacity 
to transmit the offered traffic in the neighborhood and channel 
3 is assigned as their backup channel. With the Non-Shared 
Backup scheme, one needs to reserve 5 units of backup capac-
ity in channel 3 for link (a, 6)，and another 5 units for backing 
up traffic on link (c, d). Therefore, 10 units of backup capacity 
is reserved in channel 3. Under the Shared Backup scheme, 5 
units of backup capacity in channel 3, shared by links (a, b) and 
(c, d), will suffice. By sharing the reserved capacity of a backup 
channel among neighboring links using different active channels, 
the required backup capacity can then be reduced. 
4.3.2 Lifetime of a Path with Shared Backup 
W e derive the lifetime of a path p protected under the Shared 
Backup scheme by considering its total vulnerable area which 
includes the vulnerable areas of the active channels of the links 
sharing any backup channel used by p. Figure 4.1 illustrates the 
situation. Under the Non-Shared Backup scheme, the capacity 
reserved in backup channel is not shared among the neighboring 
links. Thus, the vulnerable area is equal to the shaded area 
shown in Figure 4.1(a). With the Shared Backup scheme (Figure 
4.1(b)), the backup capacity of link (a, b) is shared with link 
(c, d). When the active channel of link (c, d) is occupied by its 
primary user, link (c，d) will take the backup capacity and no 
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(a) The vulnerable area of (b) The vulnerable area of 
backup capacity of link (a, b) backup capacity of link (a, b) 
under Non-Shared Backup under Shared Backup scheme 
scheme 
Figure 4.1: The vulnerable areas of the Non-Shared Backup and Shared 
Backup 
backup capacity is left for link (a, b). Therefore, the vulnerable 
area of the backup capacity of link (a, b) should include the 
vulnerable area of active channel of link (c, d). 
Let (BgJ be the vulnerable area of active (backup) chan-
nel Ca (Qj) of link I respectively. Let Shared-B[ be the union 
of the vulnerable areas of the neighboring links which use c as 
active channel and Cb as backup channel. The neighboring links 
using active channel Ca and link I may switch to their backup 
channel simultaneously when a primary user of Ca shows up in 
the neighborhood. Thus, the backup capacity of link I cannot be 
shared with the neighboring links using the same active channel 
Ca. As a result, P[Tg < T] is given by: 
Substitute this to Theorem 4.1, we have: 
Proposition 4.2. The upper bound for the failure probability 
with Shared Backup is given by: 
LEP 
—g-(Ac<+Ae,5j^ +Ecec\{ca} KShaTed^[)T^ (4.7) 
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4.3.3 Route Selection for paths with Shared Backup 
Similar to the Non-Shared Backup scheme, we set the link weight 
to 
- l n ( e人々 + e-(�B“+Ecec\{ca}、《S7mmLBi)T 
and then use the shortest path algorithm with this link weight 
for route selection under the Shared Backup scheme. The route 
selection algorithm for the Shared Backup scheme is shown in 
Algorithm 5. 
Algorithm 5 DSAShared_Backup_Path(Graph G, source s, destination d, 
flow / ) 
1： for all link I e G do 
2： Set the link weight as - Z n ( e - � < ^ T + e-(Ac<>^S<>+Ecec:\{c�}AcS/mrecL )^T-
3： end for 
4: GE = Edge_Graph(G, s, d, / ) / / T o construct a graph to find capacity 
feasible path 
5: Use the shortest path algorithm to find the minimum weight path P' 
from s to d in GE 
6： return P = T r a n s f o r m — P a t h / / T o transform the path from edge 
graph to original graph 
4.4 Simulation Results 
W e use the same simulation settings of Section 3.5. W e first in-
vestigate the tightness of the upper bound for the failure proba-
bility of backup protection. Then we compare the performance 
of the Shared Backup scheme and the Non-Shared Backup scheme. 
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Figure 4,2: Average failure probability of the Non-Shared Backup and the 
Shared Backup 
4.4.1 Tightness of Failure Probability Upper Bound 
for Backup Protection 
W e investigate the tightness of the upper bound of the failure 
probability of the paths selected by the Non-Shared Backup 
scheme and the Shared Backup scheme. We run the simula-
tions on the network depicted in Figure 3.9(b), choosing 100 
source destination pairs randomly. The primary user arrival 
rate is 1 x for each channel. For each source-
destination node pair, we record the duration until the path is 
interrupted, which gives the actual lifetime of the path. We 
repeat the simulation 1000 times in order to find the lifetime 
distribution of that source-destination pair. We calculate the 
failure probability upper bound and compare it with the simu-
lation results. W e also vary the protection radius to 200m and 
300m to investigate its effect. 
Figure 4.2 shows the average failure probability of the paths 
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Figure 4.3: Average failure probability of the Non-Shared Backup when the 
active channel of all links is assigned to channel 1 and the backup channel of 
all links is assigned to channel 2 
for different target lifetime requirement. It can be seen that the 
upper bound is very close to the simulated path failure probabil-
ity. Also, the upper bound and the simulated failure probability 
remain very close under different protection radii. 
In general, the tightness of the bound depends on the as-
signed channels of the path. If all assigned channels (active and 
backup) of the links on a path are different, the upper bound 
gives the exact value of the failure probability. However, Figure 
4.3 shows the average failure probability of the worst-case sce-
nario. It can be seen that the bound becomes quite loose under 
such worst-case scenario due to the dependency of failures be-
tween different links on a path, where the active channel of all 
links is assigned to channel 1 and the backup channel of all links 
is assigned to channel 2. 
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4.4.2 Comparison between the Shared Backup and Non 
Shared Backup schemes 
As the backup capacity is shared under the Shared Backup 
scheme, the consumption of backup capacity is lower than that 
of the Non-Shared Backup scheme. However, the Non-Shared 
Backup scheme can provide much longer guaranteed lifetime. 
From Figure 4.2，we notice that the Non-Shared Backup 
scheme can give a significant increase of guaranteed lifetime. 
Consider our target failure probability of 0.01 and the protec-
tion radius of 200m. The guaranteed lifetime duration is about 
1000 sec for the Shared Backup scheme, while it is above 3000 sec 
for the Non-Shared Backup. It means the Non-Shared Backup 
scheme can give more than 200% increase in call duration guar-
antee. On the other hand, it should be noted that the path 
lifetime guarantee provided by the Shared Backup scheme is 
still substantially longer than that of the single path without 
backup protection (as determined by G A C A or the Minimum 
Weight Algorithm). 
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4.5 Chapter Summary 
In this chapter we have investigated the lifetime distribution of 
a path using backup protection. We have also derived the upper 
bound for the failure probability of the path. The simulation re-
sults have shown that the upper bound is close to the simulated 
failure probability in normal situation. However, the tightness 
of the bound drops if most assigned channels are the same. 
W e have also proposed and studied the difference between 
the Shared Backup scheme and the Non-Shared Backup scheme. 
The Shared Backup scheme reduces the capacity consumption 
through the backup capacity sharing, but it gives guaranteed 
path lifetime shorter than that of the Non-Shared Backup scheme. 
The route selection algorithms for both of the backup schemes 
have also been designed. Simulation results show that the Non-
Shared Backup scheme can give more than 200% increase in 
call duration guarantee when compared with the Shared Backup 
scheme. 





Besides fulfilling the reliability requirement, we also need to en-
sure that the path has the needed capacity for different protec-
tion schemes. When a link using channel c as active channel, 
it needs to reserve a part of capacity to accommodate the addi-
tional interference when its interfering links switch to channel c 
as backup channel. Sharing of backup capacity relaxes the ca-
pacity requirement. Thus the capacity requirements are differ-
ent for the Shared Backup scheme and the Non-Shared Backup 
scheme. Therefore, we need to define specific link capacity con-
straints for each protection scheme. 
In this chapter, we first discuss how to construct an Edge 
Graph, which allows us to find the capacity-feasible paths from 
it. Constructing an Edge graph requires the link capacity con-
straints to check whether the links are capacity feasible to be 
active simultaneously. The link capacity constraints are defined 
for each protection scheme. Given any protection scheme, an 
Edge graph can be constructed using the corresponding link ca-
pacity constraints. 
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Figure 5.1: An example constructing an Edge graph 
5.2 Constructing an Edge graph 
W e extend the approach proposed in [1] to handle the case 
where multiple frequency channels are available on each link. It 
also handles the unique capacity feasibility requirements for each 
protection scheme. [1] describes how to construct an Edge graph 
for a network using one channel only. It considers there is only 
one link between two nodes, while in DSA networks, there are 
multiple logical links using different channels between two nodes. 
From the given original graph G = (V, E), we construct an 
"Edge graph" GE = (YE, EE), where a link I in G is represented 
as a unique node in GE- There is an edge connecting the node 
and in GE if two links li and I2 are connected by a common 
node and both links have enough capacity to carry the traffic 
f simultaneously. Let us illustrate it with Figure 5.1. Figure 
5.1(a) shows a graph with source node s, destination node d and 
an intermediate node a. There are two logical links between s 
and a, and between a and d. We transform it to an Edge graph. 
As there are four links in the original graph, there are four nodes 
in the Edge graph. (5, a, 1) has an edge with (a, d^  1) as they 
share a common node a. Finally we follow the approach in [1 
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Algorithm 6 Edge_Graph(Graph G, source s, destination d, flow f ) 
1： for all logical link I e L do 
2： create a node VE in the graph GE 
3： end for 
4: for all logical link € L do 
5： for all logical link I2 E L do 
6： if receiver node of li = transmitter node of I2 then 
7： Choose the function Check—Feasibility乂2，/) according to the 
protection scheme 
8： if Check_Feasibility(/i,/2,/) = TRUE then 
9： create an edge between corresponding nodes 成 and in the 
graph GE 
10： end if 
11： end if 
12： end for 
13： end for 
14： Find set X C V[GE\ where x E X is edge incident from s. 
15： Find set Y C V[GE] where y EY is edge incident on d. 
16： Add node ST to V[GE] and edges ST to X in E[GE,-
17： Add node DT to V[GE] and edges DT to Y in E[GE, • 
18： return GE 
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to add two dummy nodes St and dt into the Edge graph. We 
add an edge between St and a node in Edge graph if the node 
represents an edge incident from s. We also add an edge between 
dt and a node in Edge graph if the node represents an edge 
incident on d. Note that this algorithm is a heuristic for finding 
a feasible path. The selected path may be actually infeasible. 
However, [1] shows that the chance of finding infeasible routes is 
negligible. Therefore, by running our route selection algorithms 
on the corresponding Edge Graph, we have a very high chance 
to find a path which is capacity-feasible under the corresponding 
protection scheme. 
Algorithm 6 shows an algorithm to construct a multi-channel 
Edge graph GE' The main difference between our algorithm and 
the algorithm in [1] is that, our algorithm selects C heck-Feasibility 
function according to the protection scheme. It will be explained 
in detail in next section. 
5.3 Checking Capacity Feasibility under each 
Protection Scheme 
Each protection scheme has specific capacity feasibility require-
ment. For the No Backup scheme, we just need to check whether 
the active channel has enough capacity to carry the traffic. For 
the Shared Backup and Non-Shared Backup schemes, we need 
to check whether both active and backup channels have enough 
capacity. 
Check-Feasibility in Algorithm 6 is used to check whether 
there is enough capacity to carry the traffic f on both links at 
the same time. Based on different protection schemes, we have 
different versions of Check一Feasibility. We apply the link capac-
ity constraint in [23], which is shown in (2.2). This constraint 
states that the sum of traffic of a link and its neighboring links 
should be less than the channel capacity. Table 5.1 summarizes 
CHAPTER 5. FINDING CAPACITY-FEASIBLE ROUTES 59 
Table 5.1: Finding the available capacity under different protection schemes 
Protection Scheme Available Capacity 
No Backup AC(L) = CAP, - F{1) - EEE/C(/)厂⑷ 
Non Shared Backup ACn{1) = CAP^^ - F[L) - � F(e) 
BCM{1) = CAPc,, - Fbm{1) - Eee/ - (0 巧已） 
Shared Backup ACs(l) = CAP,^ - F{1) — Eeei^id) F � 
—maxfcec\c„ Eee仗⑴n/〜）^Bs(e) 
BCs{l) = CAP,, - Fbs{1) - Eee/4(0 尸⑷ 
“ ^Bs(e) 
the formulae for finding the available capacity under different 
protection schemes. 
5.3.1 No Backup Protection 
Let Ic{l) be the set of interfering links of link I using channel c. 
Let F{1) be the total traffic demand on link I. Let CAP�be the 
channel capacity. Let AC{1) be the available capacity on link I. 
If link I is using channel c, it will be interfered with the set of 
interfering links which use channel c (i.e. Thus, 
the available capacity AC{1) can be computed by the formula 
shown in Table 5.1. It is capacity-feasible for the link li and I2 to 
carry the traffic at the same time if AC{li) > 0 and AC{l2) > 0. 
For finding a capacity-feasible No Backup path, we use 
Check.FeasibilityMo-Backup instead of Check_Feasibility, which 
is shown in Algorithm 7. 
5.3.2 Non-Shared Backup Protection 
The capacity should be reserved on both the active channel and 
backup channel for a DSA flow using backup protection. Let 
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Algorithm 7 Check_Feasibility_NoJBackup(/i,/2,/) 
1： F{h) = F{h)-^f 
2: F{k) = Fik) + f 
3： if AC{li) > 0 and ACik) > 0 then 
4: return TRUE 
5： else 
6： return FALSE 
7： end if 
be the set of interfering links of link I, which use channel 
c as active channel. Let /f (/) be the set of interfering links of 
link I, which use channel c as backup channel. Let i W⑴ be 
the "Non-Shared Backup" traffic flow on the link I, 
Let AC]S[{1) be the available capacity on the active channel 
for the Non-Shared Backup scheme, and BCn{1) be the available 
"non-shared backup" capacity. Consider a link I uses channel 
Ca as active channel, and channel c^  as backup channel. Under 
the Non-Shared Backup scheme, link I needs to reserve part of 
capacity to accommodate the increased capacity for the inter-
fering links which choose channel Ca or ct as backup channel 
(i.e. (/) for active channel and 5]ee/f“0 for 
backup channel). Check—Feasibility algorithm of the Non-Shared 
Backup scheme is similar to that of the No Backup scheme (Al-
gorithm 7), except we need to check whether ACn(Ji), ACn(J2), 
BCn{Ii) and BCNih) are non-negative after adding f units of 
traffic demand to both link li and I2. 
5.3.3 Shared Backup Protection 
The backup capacity reservation for shared backup is more com-
plicated. Let Fbs{1) be the traffic demand on the link I requir-
ing the Shared Backup protection. Let ACs{l) be the available 
capacity on the active channel for the Shared Backup scheme. 
Consider a link I uses channel Ca as active channel, and channel 
Cb as backup channel. Under the worst case scenario, all the 
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neighboring links using the same active channel k e C\ca and 
the backup channel c^  will switch to the backup channel Ca and 
interfere with link I. We need to find out which set of neighbor-
ing links using active channel k induces the greatest interference 
to link L Link I needs to reserve mSiXk^ c\ca Z^ ee/c® (On/hz) 
for the increased interference from the neighboring links when a 
primary user appears. 
Let BCs{l) be the available "shared backup" capacity of link 
I. Only the interfering links, using the same active and backup 
channel as link I, will switch to its backup channel simultane-
ously. Therefore, it only needs to consider those interfering links' 
shared backup flows (i.e. ⑴n” ⑴)⑷).It is capacity-
feasible for link li and I2 to carry the traffic simultaneously if 
ACsih), ACsih), BCsih) and BCsih) are non-negative after 
adding f units of traffic demand to both link li and I2. 
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5.4 Chapter Summary 
In this chapter, we have investigated how to construct an Edge 
graph which allows us to find a capacity-feasible path in a DSA 
network. 
Each protection scheme has specific capacity requirement. 
For a DSA network with backup protection, we need to ensure 
both active and backup channels have enough capacity to carry 
the traffic. Therefore, we have proposed the Check一Feasibility al-
gorithms for the Shared Backup and Non-Shared Backup schemes 
to check whether the active and backup channels have enough 
available capacity. 
口 End of chapter. 
Chapter 6 
Performance Evaluations and 
Adaptive Protection 
6.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapters we have studied different route selection 
algorithms, including Minimum Weight, GACA, Shared Backup 
and Non-Shared Backup. They give different levels of protection 
and consume different amounts of capacity. 
In this chapter, we evaluate the capacity consumption and 
guaranteed lifetime between different route selection algorithms. 
W e notice that the Minimum Weight Algorithm and G A C A are 
suitable for the DSA flows with short call duration, while the 
Shared Backup and the Non-Shared Backup schemes are suit-
able for the DSA flows with long call duration. If we know 
the lifetime requirement of a DSA flow, we can choose the best 
protection scheme which provides the "just-enough" level of pro-
tection. The Adaptive Protection scheme is designed to address 
this issue, which balances the tradeoffs between the capacity 
consumption and call duration guarantee. 
W e compare the performance of the Adaptive Protection scheme 
to a network without any protection. Our Adaptive Protection 
scheme can keep the interrupt rate to 1.19%, while a network 
without protection will face 3 times more interrupts. 
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Figure 6.1: Average failure probability of different route selection algorithms 
6.2 Tradeoffs between Route Selection Algo-
rithms 
W e follow the simulation settings in Section 3.5. The simulation 
topology in shown in Figure 3.9(b). We select 1000 source desti-
nation pairs randomly and we find the average failure probability 
of the paths selected by different route selection algorithms. 
Figure 6.1 shows the average failure probability of the path 
found by different routing algorithms. The average failure prob-
ability of the paths selected by the Minimum Weight Algorithm 
is the highest and the failure probability of the paths selected by 
the Non-Shared Backup Algorithm is the lowest. Given a target 
failure probability, such as 1%, the average guaranteed lifetime 
for the "Minimum Weight" paths is low (about 180s), while the 
average guaranteed lifetime of the "Non-Shared Backup" paths 
is very high (about 3200s). 
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Table 6.1: Comparison between route selection algorithms using carried load 
(C.L.) and interrupt percentage (LP.) 
mean call duration 180s 900s 1800s 
C.L. I.P. C.L. I. P. C.L. I.P. 
Minimum Weight 99.79 1.64 91.61 4.03 73.75 12.26 
GACA 98.94 0.82 89.31 3.80 70.7 8.47 
Shared Backup 97.54 0.11 74.06 0.14 57.1 1.26 
Non-Shared Backup 91.91 0 60.79 0.12 46.38 0.52 
Although the Non-Shared Backup scheme can increase the 
lifetime duration significantly, it consumes more network capac-
ity for protection. W e investigate the capacity consumption for 
each route selection algorithm. We generate the DSA end-to-
end flows according to the following parameters: Two nodes are 
randomly selected as the source and destination nodes for each 
flow. The interarrival time of the end-to-end flows is exponen-
tial distributed with mean = 60 seconds. The flow demand is 
uniformly distributed between 0 and 6 units. 
W e generate the primary users according to the following 
parameters: The primary user arrival rate is 1 X l O - ^ ^ m ' ^ s e c - ^ 
for each channel. The primary users are generated at random 
locations. The "holding-time" of primary users is exponential 
distributed with an average of 900 seconds. 
Table 6.1 shows the tradeoffs between the interrupt percent-
age and the carried load under different average call durations. 
Interrupt percentage is defined as the percentage of the DSA 
flows which cannot be protected by the corresponding protec-
tion scheme before the flow finishes its transmission. The carried 
load is defined as the percentage of the DSA flows which are able 
to admit to the DSA network. 
For short average call duration (i.e. ISOsec), all 4 protection 
schemes have low interrupt percentage. However, for long av-
erage call duration (i.e. ISOOsec), backup protection can keep 
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the interrupt percentage low, while the interrupt percentages of 
the Minimum Weight Algorithm and G A C A become high. The 
Shared Backup and Non-Shared Backup schemes need to pay the 
price to keep their interrupt rates low, which results in decrease 
in carried load. These results show that there exist the tradeoffs 
between the capacity consumption and call duration guarantee 
for different protection schemes. High level of protection results 
longer call duration guarantee, but it consumes more network 
capacity for protection and thus reduces the carried load. 
W e notice that the Minimum Weight Algorithm and G A C A 
are suitable for the DSA flows with short call duration, because 
they consume less network capacity but still have low inter-
rupt percentage. The Shared Backup and Non-Shared Backup 
schemes are suitable for the DSA flows with long call duration, 
because they can prolong the lifetime significantly so that they 
can provide the needed protection to the long call duration flows. 
6.3 Adaptive Protection 
Intuitively, the Minimum Weight, GACA, Shared Backup and 
Non-shared Backup schemes provide increasing level of protec-
tion, in that order. A higher level of protection prolongs the call 
lifetime significantly, but it consumes more network capacity. If 
we apply the Non-Shared Backup scheme to all DSA flows, it 
is likely that the lifetime requirements can be satisfied for most 
DSA flows. However, it consumes unnecessary backup capacity. 
It is because it is not necessary to provide backup protection to 
the short call duration flows. High backup capacity consump-
tion reduces the number of calls that can be supported by the 
network. On the other hand, if we apply the Minimum Weight 
Algorithm to all DSA flows, most DSA flows can be admitted. 
However, the interrupt percentage increases significantly with 
the call duration, which degrades the reliability for the wire-
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less applications. If we know the lifetime requirement of a DSA 
flow, we can choose the lowest level of protection which satisfies 
the requirement while conserving network capacity. Therefore, 
the highest amount of traffic can be admitted to the network, 
while the interrupt percentage can still be controlled below an 
acceptable level. 
In practice, different classes of applications may be associated 
with different lifetime requirements. We can collect the call 
duration statistics for each application class and choose the most 
effective protection scheme accordingly. For example, we can set 
a dili'ereiit guaranteed lifetime value for VoIP applications and 
for video streaming applications. As a result, the needed lifetime 
duration can be guaranteed for each class of applications, while 
the required capacity can be reduced. 
6.3.1 Route Selection for Adaptive Protection 
W e apply the 4 route selection algorithms in the order of Min-
imum Weight, GACA, Shared Backup and Non-Shared Backup 
and determine the corresponding upper bound of the failure 
probability of the selected route. If a scheme can meet the tar-
get failure probability p, the algorithm terminates and uses the 
corresponding selected path with scheme to protect the flow. 
Otherwise, we run the route selection algorithm of the next 
higher-level of protection scheme until the path failure prob-
ability is guaranteed to be lower than p. It is possible that we 
cannot satisfy the requirement even when the highest-level of 
protection, namely, the Non-Shared Backup scheme is used. In 
this case, the Non-Shared Backup scheme will be used as a best 
effort protection. Algorithm 8 shows our Adaptive Protection 
scheme. 
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Algorithm 8 DSAAdaptive_Protection(Graph G, source s, destination d, 
flow / ) 
1： Run DSAMin_Weight //Algorithm 1 
2: if the computed path satisfies lifetime requirement then 
3： return computed path 
4： else 
5： Run DSA_GACA //Algorithm 3 
6： if the computed path satisfies lifetime requirement then 
7： return computed path 
8： else 
9： Run DSAShared-Backup_Path //Algorithm 5 
10： if the computed path satisfies lifetime requirement then 
11： return computed path 
12： else 
13: Run DSANon_Shared_Backup_Path //Algorithm 4 
14： return computed path 
15： end if 
16： end if 
17： end if 
6.3.2 Finding a Capacity-Feasible Path for Adaptive 
Protection 
Under our Adaptive Protection scheme, there exist 3 kinds of 
flows in DSA networks (No Backup flow, Shared Backup flow 
and Non-Shared Backup flow). We need to define the new link 
capacity constraints to handle the coexistence of 3 kinds of flows. 
Let Adaptive-AC{I) be the available active capacity of link I, 
Ada'ptii)e一BCN (S) be the available "non-shared backup" capac-
ity, and Adaptive_BCs(I) be the available "shared backup" ca-
pacity. 
As 3 types of flows coexist in a network, any link in the net-
work needs to reserve part of capacity for the Shared Backup and 
Non-Shared Backup flows carrying on the link and also its neigh-
boring links. The amount of needed backup capacity depends 
on the type of backup protection (Shared Backup or Non-Shared 
Backup). 
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Table 6.2: Finding the available capacity for Adaptive Protection scheme 
Available Capacity 
AdaptiveJ[C{l) = CAP,^ - F(l) — Eeei^H)厂�—EeG/«(/) ^siv(e) 
- m a x f c e c \ c „ 
Adaptive.BCM{l) = CAP,, — Eee/^W 厂 � “ l l e a ^ ^ M FBN� 
—maxfcec E e e ( / 4 � u O n � � 厂朋⑷ 
Adaptive^DCsjl) = CAP,^ — Ee€/4_(0 厂 � — + FBsje)) 
Each protection scheme uses specific formulae in Table 6.2 
to check the capacity-feasibility. A DSA flow without backup 
protection should check whether Adaptive-AC is non-negative 
after adding the new traffic demand of f units. If a DSA flow 
is under the Shared Backup Protection, it should check whether 
Adaptive-AC and AdaptiveJ3Cs are non-negative. If a DSA 
flow is under the Non-Shared Backup Protection, it should check 
whether Adaptive—AC and Adaptive一BCn are non-negative. 
6.4 Comparison between No Protection and 
Adaptive Protection 
W e investigate the performance of our Adaptive Protection scheme. 
W e consider the case that there exist three classes of applica-
tions with mean call duration ISOsec, 900sec and ISOOsec. Each 
DSA flow has equal probability to be one of the three classes of 
applications. 
"No Protection" is a baseline algorithm which applies the 
Dijkstra shortest path algorithm using hop-count as the met-
ric. Thus, it does not have any explicit protection considera-
tions. Table 6.3 shows the tradeoffs between "No protection" 
and "Adaptive Protection". The carried load of "No Protec-
tion" is higher than that of "Adaptive Protection"，as it does 
not reserve any capacity for protection. However, the inter-
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Table 6.3: Comparison between "No protection" and "Adaptive Protection" 
schemes using carried load (C.L.) and interrupt percentage (LP.) - Mixed 
flows with mean call duration - 180s, 900s and 1800s 
mean call arrival 60s 120s 
C.L. I.P. C.L. I. P. 
No Protection 87.54 5.34 97.84 4.76 
Adaptive Protection (p二5%) 76.07 2.19 87.23 1.24 
Adaptive Protection (p=l%) 69.71 1.19 83.46 0.39 
rupt percentage of the "No protection" is higher than that of 
"Adaptive Protection". In the case of 60sec mean call arrival, 
by reducing 20.4% of the carried load, the Adaptive Protection 
scheme can keep the interrupt rate to 1.19%, while a network 
without protection faces 3 times more interrupts. 
Also, we notice that we can balance the tradeoffs between 
the carried load and the interrupt percentage by controlling the 
target failure probability p. The carried load of Adaptive Pro-
tection (5%) is higher than that of Adaptive Protection (1%). 
From Figure 6.1, we can notice that given a higher target failure 
probability, the guaranteed lifetime T is longer. Therefore, for 
a higher target failure probability p, we can use less protective 
scheme but still can meet the target. For example, given the 
same DSA flow, we can use No Backup Protection to meet the 
target failure probability of 5%, while we need to use Shared 
Backup Protection to meet the target failure probability of 1%. 
Therefore, Adaptive Protection (5%) consumes less capacity for 
protection and thus the carried load is higher. 
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6.5 Chapter Summary 
III this chapter, we have studied the tradeoffs between differ-
ent route selection algorithms in terms of capacity consumption 
and call duration guarantee. We have shown that we can use 
the network capacity more effectively if we know the lifetime re-
quirement for each DSA flow. The Adaptive Protection scheme 
has been studied which balances the capacity consumption and 
the call duration guarantee. Compared to a baseline scheme 
("No Protection"), our adaptive protection can reduce the in-
terrupt rate to 1 /4 of that of the case when "No Protection" is 
offered. 
• End of chapter. 
Chapter 7 
Restoration Capacity Planning 
and Channel Assignment 
7.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapters we have discussed how to find a long 
lifetime path while assuming the capacity is preplanned, i.e. the 
channel assignment is given. However, the network capacity can 
be better utilized if the channel assignments for the active and 
backup channels are considered. Figure 7.1 illustrates the im-
portance of optimal channel assignment for the Shared Backup 
scheme. Let the channel capacity is 10 units. Link (a, b) and 
(c, d) can interfere with each other if they are using the same 
channel. The number outside (inside) the bracket represents the 
assigned active (backup) channel number for each link. In Fig-
ure 7.1(a), the maximum active flow for each link is 10. It is due 
to the channel assignment which assigns the same backup chan-
nel to both links. Thus, the backup capacity can be shared by 
link (a, b) and (c, d). However, in Figure 7.1(b), the maximum 
active flow for link (a, b) is 5 only. Because link (a, b) needs to 
reserve a part of capacity for link (c, d) when link (c, d) switches 
to its backup channel 1. In this case, the backup capacity cannot 
be shared by two links. This example shows how backup capac-
ity sharing can be affected by the active and backup channel 
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Figure 7.1: An example shows the effect of channel assignment to backup 
capacity sharing 
assignments, which thus affects the link throughput. 
In this chapter, we consider the channel assignment problem 
with restoration consideration, which is referred to as the link 
restoration problem. We consider that the link demand is a 
given system parameter. Our objective is to maximize the link 
throughput with backup protection. The capacity is planned 
such that the link throughput for the link using backup channel 
can be guaranteed to be greater than a predefined value, e.g. 
a given fraction of link demand. By considering the channel 
assignment and the interference between links, the link restora-
tion problem is formulated as an integer programming problem. 
It provides the needed protection for each wireless link, at the 
same time it maximizes the link throughput. 
Channel assignment problem has been proved as NP-hard 
problem in [29]. It is described as follows: Given the expected 
load Ci on each link i, the channel assignment problem is to as-
sign one channel to each network interface such that the avail-
able bandwidth is at least equal to e^ . We conjecture our prob-
lem is NP-hard as well. Our formulation provides an efficient 
way to compute the optimal channel assignment. 
We compare our Shared Backup and Non-Shared Backup 
schemes to a baseline scheme "No Restore Plan". The results 
show that a network without restoration planning has a high 
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chance to experience interrupts when the primary users appear. 
This illustrates the need of link restoration in DSA networks. 
Our optimal channel assignment outperforms the random 
channel assigiiinent significantly in terms of maximizing the link 
throughput, which shows the importance of channel assignment 
in capacity utilization. 
7.2 System Model 
In this section, we focus on formulating the link restoration prob-
lem for the Shared Backup scheme. The formulation can be 
modified easily to handle the “No Backup" and "Non-Shared 
Backup" schemes. 
W e follow the approach of [27] to model multi-channel as-
signment for wireless mesh networks and extend their model to 
cover link restoration considerations. Let L be the set of logi-
cal links. W e assume that there is only one link between two 
nodes. However, the formulation can be easily modified to han-
dle multiple links scenario. The logical link from node a to node 
b is denoted by (a, b) G L. Let Da,b denote the link demand 
on link (a, b). Da,b is the maximum link flow for the link (a，6). 
W e assume that the link demand is given as a system param-
eter. In practice, the link demand can be either derived from 
the statistical usage of the link, or obtained by aggregating the 
end-to-end demands passing through it. Let C be the set of 
frequency channels. 
7.2.1 Channel Assignment Model 
Two different channels will be assigned to each link. One channel 
is the active channel and another is the backup one. Therefore 
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we define two binary channel-assignment variables. 
1 If node a communicates with node b through 
x\b,c = \ channel c as active channel 
0 Otherwise 
\ 
1 If node a communicates with node b through 
ya,b,c = \ channel c as backup channel 
0 Otherwise 
\ 
Nodes a and b should be assigned to a common channel in 
order to be able to communicate with each other. And one 
active channel and one backup channel should be assigned to 
link (a, h). Thus we have: 
= b^,a,c (7.1) 
ya,b,c = yb,a,c (7.2) 
X ] = 1 (7.3) 
ceC 
&， 6， c = l (7.4) 
ceC 
Also, the active channel and backup channel of a link should 
be different. Thus, 
Xa,b,c + yaAc < 1 (7.5) 
7.2.2 Presence of Primary Users 
Some primary users have already appeared before the system 
computes the capacity planning. We assume one primary user 
occupies at most one secondary channel. Let P be the set of link 
channels already occupied by primary users. We use (a, c) G P 
to represent that channel c of link (a, b) has been occupied by 
a primary user. Under such scenario, neither the active nor 
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backup channels should be assigned to channel c of link (a, 6). 
Thus, we have: 
Xa,b,c = 0,y{a,b,c)eP (7.6) 
yaAc = 0,V(a,6,c)GP (7.7) 
7.2.3 Link Flow Rates 
Let fa,i) ) be the link flow on link (a, b) using its active 
(backup) channel. Assume the capacity of each channel is fixed 
and equal to h units. Let I (a, b) be the set of links which inter-
fere with link (a, b) when they use the same frequency channel. 
The total link throughput of link (a, b) and its interfering links 
I (a, h) should not be greater than the channel capacity. 
When a link (a, b) uses its active channel c“ it will be inter-
fered by its interfering links (m, n) G /(a, b) which use channel q 
as either active or backup channel (i.e. XIq gC ^a,b,CiXm,n,Ci = 1 or 
T.ciec^ aAciym,n,Ci = 1). Under our "one new type of primary-
user at a time" assumption, only one single new channel will 
be occupied for each link and its interfering links. Therefore, 
only the interfering links (m, n) G /(a, 6), using the same active 
channel Cj G C, will switch to their backup channels simulta-
neously. Link (a, h) will be interfered by the interfering links 
which use the same active channel Cj A N D backup channel q 
J2cieC 工a,b,ciya,b,ci 二 1). Tlius, we have: 
fa,b \ 飞 / fm,n \ 飞 
(m’n)e/(a’6) qgC 
丨 /m’n � < 1 
I 7工m,n,Cj / J 工a,b,Ciym,n,Ci J f：::丄， 
^ c氏C 
V(a,b)eL,VcjeC (7.8) 
When a link (a, b) uses its backup channel q, it will be inter-
fered by the interfering links (m, n) G /(a, b) which use channel 
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Ci as either active or backup channel (i.e. Ec^gC yaM^rn,n,Ci 二 1 
or K 姊 ya,b,Ciym,n’Ci = 1). Assunie that link (a, 6) uses channel 
Cj as its active channel. Only the interfering links which use 
channel Cj as active channel, will switch to their backup chan-
nels at the same time as link (a, 6), i.e. J2cjeC^ a,b,cjXm,n,cj = 1. 
Thus, link (a, b) will be interfered by its interfering links which 
use active channel Cj and backup channel q, i.e. 
工a,b,CjIm,n,Cj) ya,b’Ciym,n,Ci) 二 1 
cjeC CiGC 
Thus, we have: 
/g.b f / m ’ n y ^ 
{m,n)el{a,b) cieC 
^ J^ (^ T^a,b,CjTm,n’Cj)(^ y^a,b,Ciym,n,Ci)〉^ 1， 
CjEC q g C 
V(a, b)eL (7.9) 
7.2.4 Problem Formulation 
Our goal is to guarantee a fraction, p, of ongoing link demand 
on every link even when a new type of primary-users suddenly 
appears. Let 0 < p < 1 and thus both the active flow and 
backup flow should be at least pDa’b. Therefore, pDa,b is the 
guaranteed throughput for link (a, 6). By adjusting p, we can 
control the tradeoffs between the guarantee requirement and 
overall network throughput (including the unprotected traffic 
throughput). Thus, 
/a ,6 > PDa,b (7.10) 
After reserving the backup capacity, the active flow is max-
imized by using the remaining capacity. Our objective is to 
maximize the fraction, g, of link demand to be satisfied for all 
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links. Let 0 < ^ < 1 and we want to maximize g such that 
/a,6 > gDa’b. However, in some cases, the link flow will be lim-
ited by some bottleneck links. Thus, we want to maximize the 
non-bottleneck link flows, depending on the link demands by 
using the following objective function: 
{a,b)eL 
> fa^b > 9Da,b (7.11) 
9>P (7.12) 
where ki and /c2 are constant and ki》/c2. By considering all 
constraints (1)-(12), the link restoration problem can be repre-
sented by a non-linear mixed integer program. 
max/Cip + /C2 ^ fa,bDa,b 
{a,b)eL 
Da,b > fa,b > gDa.b 
g>p 
III > PDa,b 
工 aj),c —工 b,a,c 
ya,b,c ~ yb,a,c 
y^ 工a’b’c = 1 
ceC 
yaAc = 1 
ceC 
工 a,b,c + ya,b,c — 1 
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Figure 7.2: Simulation Topology 
fa’b ^^ / fm,n 
{m,n)el{a,b) CiEC 
丄 ^ 爪 、 1 
H J^$m’n,Cj / ^ 工aJ)’Ciym’n,Ci j ^ 丄 
CieC 
fa,b / fm,n ^ 
{m,n)el{a,b) QeC" 
^工 a ’ b , C j I m , n , C j ) ( ^ ^ ya,b，Ciym,n,Ci)^ ^ 1 
Cj-eC CiGC 
XaAc = 0，ya,b,c = 0, V(a, 6’ c) e P 
工a’6,ce {0,1}, "aAce{0，l} (7.13) 
Using the binary linearization techniques in [27], this non-
linear mixed integer program can be converted to a linear mixed-
integer program and solved effectively using some commercial 
software such as CPLEX [30'. 
7.3 Simulation Results 
The simulation topology is shown in Figure 7.2 [28]. The area 
covered by the network is 300m x 200m. Ten nodes are located 
in the field. Three orthogonal frequency channels are available 
(C = 3) for every link. The channel capacity is 20 units {h 二 
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20). The communication and interference range is set to 100m 
and 150m respectively. The protection area of a primary user 
is assumed to be a unit disk with radius 150m. Five end-to-
eiid flows are randomly generated and each end-to-end flow has 
a random demand following the uniform distribution U(0,10). 
Link demand Da’b is calculated by aggregating all demands of the 
end-to-end flows passing through the link. In this simulation, 
five different random scenarios are simulated. For each scenario, 
we use the same network topology but different link demands. 
W e compare the performance of the Shared Backup and Non-
Shared Backup schemes to a baseline scheme (No Restore Plan). 
"No Restore Plan" considers the optimal capacity utilization 
without planning the backup capacity for restoration. When the 
primary users appear, the affected links switch to unoccupied 
channels randomly. 
To evaluate whether the guarantee link throughput require-
ment is satisfied, the simulation is repeated 1000 times. Each 
time two primary users of the same type (i.e. occupying the 
same frequency channel) are generated at 2 random locations in 
the network field. The guarantee percentage is defined as the 
percentage of all simulation cases which the link throughput of 
each link is at least pDa,b after two primary users appear. 
7.3.1 Comparison between “Shared Backup" and "No 
Restore Plan” using Guarantee Percentage and 
Reduced Capacity 
W e investigate the amount of network throughput to be reduced 
in order to guarantee the traffic. We set p = 0.5 and compare 
"No Restore Plan" and our "Shared Backup" schemes for all 
five scenarios by the total link throughput, reduced capacity be-
fore two primary users appear, and the guarantee percentage 
after two primary users appear. Reduced capacity is defined 
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Table 7.1: Total link throughput, reduced capacity before two primary users 
appear, and guarantee percentage after two primary users appear when p=0.5 
Total Link Reduced Guarantee 
Throughput Capacity Percentage 
Scenario No Restore Plan Shared Backup Shared Backup No Restore Plan 
1 — 69.02 - 54.25 — 21.5% 58.2% 
2 78.51 _ 58.79 25.1% 55.3% 
3 ~ 77.57 _ 62.49 — 19.4% 45.7% 
4 86.06 61.71 一 28.3% 56.3% 
5 72.78 51.29 — 29.5% 38.5% 
Average 76.79 57.70 24.8% 一 50.8% 
as the percentage difference between the total link throughput 
of "No Restore Plan" and "Shared Backup" schemes. The re-
sults are shown in Table 7.1. When p 二 0.5, although the total 
link throughput of our "Shared Backup" scheme is lower than 
that of "No Restore Plan，，model by 24.8% on average, our algo-
rithm meets the guarantee requirement in all simulation cases as 
expected, while "No Restore Plan" just meets the guarantee re-
quirement in 50.8% of all simulation cases. It means that each 
time a single type of primary users appears, the chance that 
some flows experience interrupts is about 50%, which causes 
serious performance degradation to wireless applications. 
7.3.2 Comparison using Traffic Demand Scaling Factor 
g and Guarantee Fraction p 
Maximum fraction of link demand that can be supported in 
Scenario 1 is 0.735. Both g and p are not greater than 0.735. 
W e use this value to normalize the value of g and p. 
The normalized values of g for the three schemes under Sce-
nario 1 are shown in Figure 7.3. The normalized value of g for 
the "No Restore Plan" scheme is the highest because the scheme 
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does not reserve any capacity for restoration. This also explains 
why the value of g does not change as p varies for the “No Re-
store Plan" scheme. For the "Shared Backup" and "Non-Shared 
Backup" schemes, g decreases when p increases, corresponding 
to the tradeoffs between maximizing guarantee requirement vs. 
overall network throughput. Higher guarantee requirement con-
sumes more channel capacity as backup capacity which leads 
to reduction in the overall network throughput. Notice that 
the values of g for "Shared Backup" and "Non-Shared Backup" 
drop to zero when p = 0.73 and p = 0.57 respectively. This 
means that there is not enough channel capacity to support the 
active flow and backup flow beyond such fraction of guarantee 
requirement. 
Note also that the values of g for the "Shared Backup" scheme 
is higher than that of the "Non-Shared Backup" one. When 
p = 0.54，the value of g for the “Shared Backup" scheme is 
higher than that of "Non-Shared Backup" model by 32.8%. This 
quantifies the benefit of backup capacity sharing enabled by our 
shared backup protection in terms of improving the network 
throughput. 
The guarantee percentage after two primary users appear is 
shown in Figure 7.4. p is the minimum fraction of link demand 
that the DSA network needs to guarantee. If p is low, "No 
Restore Plan" scheme can still satisfy the guarantee (by luck) 
via the choosing of an unoccupied channel in a random man-
ner. However, its guarantee percentage drops quickly with the 
increase of p. In contrast, our shared backup protection scheme 
reserves capacity for restoration and therefore can satisfy the 
guarantee requirement in all simulation cases as long as p is less 
than 0.71. 
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7.3.3 Comparison between Optimal Channel Assign-
ment and Random Channel Assignment 
W e investigate the importance of channel assignment by com-
paring our optimal "Shared Backup" channel assignment to the 
random channel assignment. For random channel assignment, 
we assign one active channel and one backup channel to each 
link randomly. It follows our objective to maximize the link 
throughput with protection. In other words, we run the same 
integer programming (7.13) but the active and backup chan-
nels are assigned explicitly. W e generate 100 random channel 
assignments and find the average g for each p. In some cases 
the computed link throughput is less than pDa,b, which means 
it cannot satisfy the guarantee requirement. For these cases we 
set the value of g to zero. 
Figure 7.5 shows the normalized values of g of both chan-
nel assignments, g of optimal "Shared Backup" channel as-
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signment is much higher than g of random assignment. With 
optimal channel assignment from the integer programming, the 
network capacity can be better utilized for backup capacity shar-
ing. Our optimal channel assignment outperforms the random 
channel assignment significantly in terms of maximizing the link 
throughput, which shows the importance of channel assignment 
in capacity utilization. 
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7.4 Chapter Summary 
Optimal channel assignment with restorations has been studied 
in this chapter. It has been formulated as an integer linear 
programming problem. 
W e have compared our Shared Backup and Non-Shared Backup 
scheme to a baseline scheme (No Restore Plan). The network 
with our preplanned protection meets the guarantee require-
ment in all simulation cases, while No Restore Plan just meets 
the guarantee requirement in 50.8% of all simulation cases. 
W e have also investigated the importance of channel assign-
ment in maximizing the link throughput. By comparing our op-
timal channel assignment to the random channel assignment, the 
link throughput of random assignment decreases substantially, 
which shows that our optimal channel assignment outperforms 
the random assignment in terms of the network capacity utiliza-
tion. 
• End of chapter. 
Chapter 8 
Conclusion and Future Works 
Dynamic Spectrum Access networks improve the spectrum effi-
ciency by enabling secondary users to use the licensed band if 
they do not cause harmful interference to the primary users. A 
secondary user should stop using the licensed band and switch to 
another unoccupied band when it determines that it can cause 
harmful interference to primary iiser(s). However, there is no 
guarantee that the new spectrum band has sufficient capacity 
to carry the switch-over traffic. The link capacity available to 
the secondary users can therefore fluctuate significantly which 
can result in service interruptions. There is a need to provide 
reliable transmission for wireless applications in DSA networks. 
In this thesis, we have studied the reliability issue in DSA net-
works. W e have proposed 3 protection schemes, namely the "No 
Backup"，"Shared Backup" and "Non-Shared Backup" schemes, 
each providing a different level of reliability to an end-to-end 
DSA flow. W e have quantified the lifetime distributions of an 
end-to-end path in a DSA network under the aforementioned 
protection schemes. W e also have derived an upper bound for 
the failure probability of a path under each of the protection 
scheines. Such perfonnaiice bound then serves as an efficient 
tool for checking whether a selected path can satisfy the reli-
ability requirement of a given DSA flow. The tightness of the 
upper bound has been evaluated through simulation. 
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We have proven that the problem of finding the maximum 
lifetime path without backup protection is NP-hard. Heuris-
tic based route selection algorithms have been proposed, which 
consider the unique link failure properties of a DSA path to find 
paths with long lifetime. 
It has been shown that the proposed protection schemes have 
interesting tradeoffs between capacity consumption and call du-
ration guarantee. Higher level of protection prolongs the call 
lifetime significantly, but it consumes more network capacity. 
Our simulation results showed that compared with the Mini-
m u m Weight Algorithm, there is a 33.6% decrease in carried 
load of the network when the Non-Shared Backup scheme is 
used. In return, the Non-Shared Backup scheme can reduce the 
interrupt rate by 97.02%. 
The Adaptive Protection scheme has been proposed which 
selects the best protection scheme adaptively according to the 
lifetime requirement of a DSA flow. It provides the needed 
protection to a DSA flow, while reducing the network capacity 
consumption by selecting the "just-enough" level of protection 
Compared to a baseline scheme ("No Protection"), our adap-
tive protection can reduce the interrupt rate to 1/4 of that of 
the case when "No Protection" is offered. 
The network capacity can be further optimized via judicious 
channel assignments for active and backup channels. We have 
formulated this channel assignment problem in DSA networks 
as ail integer programming problem to support capacity-efficient 
link restorations in such networks. 
In view of this work, one of the possible future works is to 
consider a distributed algorithm for channel assignment. While 
our centralized algorithm provides the exact optimal solution 
for link restoration, we may extend our centralized algorithm 
with global information to a distributed algorithm requiring only 
local information. 
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Another possibility is to consider joint routing and channel 
assignment for protection. The lifetime of a DSA path is closely 
related to the assigned channels of the links. Assigning the same 
channel to all links helps to increase the lifetime of a path. How-
ever, it will reduce the network capacity substantially. Joint 
routing and channel assignment algorithm can find the optimal 
solution to provide the needed protection for the DSA flows 
while maximizing the network capacity. 
• End of chapter. 
Appendix A 
Proof of Theorem (3.1) in 
Chapter 3 
W e prove the union of vulnerable area A^ of the Chain Approx-
imation is larger than the A^ , of the original path for channel 
c. 
W e prove it by Mathematical Induction. Let n be the number 
of nodes. When n = 3, the union of the area of the first two cir-
cles is fixed. And the maximum increase of area after including 
the third node is the "Red area" (Fig. A.l). This area can be 
achieved when the topology is chain. So the statement is true 
when n — 3. 
Assume the statement is true for n — k. When n = /c + 1， 
node {k+1} is added to the path. Let A/^ +i be the added area 
by the node {k+1}. Let Uk+i be the union of area of nodes 
{l"k+l}. 
max [/fc+i = max Uk + max Ak+i 
、J 
Figure A . l : Increased vulnerable area of a newly added node 
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By the assumption, we can achieve max Uk if the topology is 
chain topology. W e can also achieve max Ak+i if the topology 
is chain topology. Therefore the statement is also true for n = 
/c + 1, which completes the proof of channel c. 
Ac of the Chain Approximation is larger than Ac of the orig-
inal path for channel c. Therefore, the interrupt rate Y^c ^ c入 
of the Chain Approximation is higher than that of the original 
path. As the lifetime of a path is Exponential(EeAcA3)，the 
larger the value of the interrupt rate Yjc 入c八 is, the higher the 
failure probability of a path is. Therefore, the failure probability 
from the Chain Approximation is an upper bound of the original 
path. 
Appendix B 
Proof of Theorem (4.1) in 
Chapter 4 
尸[lifetime < T] = P[min{max{T^，T^}} < T 
I 
= 1 - P[min{max{Tji,r^}} > T 
Let Ml be max{Tji,r^}. Then, 
P[mm{Mi} >T] = P[Mi >T,\/l G P] 
=巧Ml > T]P[M2 > T\Mi > T 
...P[Mp > T\Mi > T ,…，M p _ i > T 
Let us consider the term P[M2 > T\Mi > T . 
P[M2 > TjMi >T] = 1 - P[M2 < T|Mi > T 
= 1 - P[Tl < T n T| < T\Mi > T 
= 1 — P p l < T\Mi > T ] P [ r | < T\Mi > T 
Let us consider the term P[T] < T\Mi > T]. W e want to 
prove that P[T] < T\Mi > T] < P[T] < T]. If the vulnerable 
area of link 1 is not overlapped with the vulnerable area of link 
2，s active channel, then, 
P[Tl < T\Mi >T] = P[Tl < T 
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For the case that the vulnerable areas are overlapped, without 
loss of generality, assume the vulnerable area of link 1，s active 
channel is overlapped with the vulnerable area of link 2's active 
channel. Because the active channel and backup channel of link 
1 are different, the vulnerable area of link I's backup channcl 
is not overlapped with the vulnerable area of link 2's active 
channel. The information Mi > T means T\ > T oi T^ > T 
or T\> TnT^ > T. If T^ > T, because the vulnerable area 
of link I's backup channel is not overlapped with link 2's active 
channel, which means T】and Tg are independent. Thus, 
P[Tl < T\Mi >T] = P[Tl < T 
Let us consider the case for T\ > T. Let T^ be the lifetime 
of the part of vulnerable area of link 2 which is overlapped with 
link 1. Therefore, P[Tf < T\T\ > T] = 0. Let Tf be the 
lifetime of the remaining vulnerable area of link 2 which is not 
overlapped with link 1. Therefore, and T\ are independent. 
Thus, 
P[Tl < T\Mi > T 
= < T U r ] " < TjMi > T 
=P[Tl' < T\Mi�r] + < T\Mi > T 
-尸 [Tjo < T\Mi > r]P[T]" < T\Mi > T 
二 < T\Mi > T 
= < T 
< P[Tf <T] + < T\ 
-P[Tl' < T]P[Tj^ < T 
=P[Tl < T 
Similarly, for the case T\> TnT^ > T, P[T] < T\Mi > 
T] < P[Tl < T]. Therefore, for all cases, 
P[Tl < T\Mi >T]< P[TI < T 
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By the same reasoning, 
< T\Mi >T]< P[T| < T 
Therefore, 
P[M2 > T|Mi > T 
= 1 - P[Tl < T\Mi > T]P[T| < TjMi > T 
> P[M2 > T 
By the same reasoning, 
P[Mi > T\Mi > T , M / _ i >T] > P[Mi > T. 
Hence, 
P [lifetime < T 
=1 - P[min{max{Tji,T^}} > T 
= 1 - P[Mi > T]P[M2 > T\Mi > T 
...P[Mp>T|Mi >r,..,Mp_i>T] 




=1 - JJ(1 — < T]P[T^ < T]) 
LEP 
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